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ARE DAMAGES DIFFERENT?: BIVENS 




Litigation challenging the national security actions of the federal 
government has taken a seemingly paradoxical form in recent years. 
Prospective coercive remedies like injunctions and habeas corpus (a type 
of injunction) are traditionally understood to involve much greater 
intrusions by the judiciary into government functioning than retrospective 
money damages awards. Yet, federal courts have developed and strictly 
applied doctrines barring Bivens damages actions against federal officials 
because of an asserted need to preserve the prerogatives of the political 
branches in national security and foreign affairs. At the same time, the 
courts have been increasingly assertive in cases involving coercive 
remedies, especially habeas, that have dramatically impacted post-9/11 
national security policies. Additionally, federal courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, are increasingly willing to rule against the executive in 
cases concerning justiciability and judicial power. 
To date, the limitations on Bivens have been subject to nearly 
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universal criticism. In contrast, this Article sympathetically explores why 
the courts have taken this apparently paradoxical approach to litigation 
concerning alleged official wrongdoing in the national security and foreign 
affairs contexts. Two long-term trends, not unique to national security and 
foreign affairs cases, help explain why damages are disfavored. First, the 
increasing role that judicial supremacy plays in the Court’s self-conception 
means that law declaring in published opinions is often seen as an 
adequate substitute for individualized dispute resolution and redress. 
Second, and related, Congress’s and the Court’s preferred legal method 
for holding the executive accountable to the law has shifted from tort suits 
tried to juries to coercive remedies deployed by judges.  
There are also reasons for disfavoring damages that are largely 
unique to national security and foreign relations contexts. If suits seeking 
damages were routinely available in these kinds of cases, there would 
likely be unique discovery burdens and complications; a greatly expanded 
pool of potential plaintiffs and hence many more suits filed than at present; 
less ability for the executive to moot disruptive litigation; and, in this 
expanded number of lawsuits, difficult and consequential decisions about 
whether to extend robust constitutional protections developed for domestic, 
peacetime contexts to the very different worlds of military, intelligence, and 
other security activities. Though the empirical basis for this judgment is 
disputed, the Court is convinced that damages suits cause 
“overdeterrence”; and it seems particularly concerned about this in 
foreign affairs and national security contexts where the executive’s 
flexibility, vigor, and decisiveness are thought most desirable. In addition, 
the Court might be reluctant to allow Bivens suits in national security and 
foreign affairs cases because there is an increasing array of other 
mechanisms, including many nonjudicial ones, to ensure executive 
compliance with the law, making the costs of Bivens suits perhaps seem 
unjustifiably high. Taken together, these factors help explain why the 
Court’s modern assertiveness is expressed primarily in suits seeking 
coercive rather than money damages remedies. 
The bar on Bivens in national security and foreign affairs contexts has 
real costs, as it sacrifices redress and compensation for wronged 
individual, and, arguably, deterrence of executive lawbreaking. This 
Article concludes by suggesting that an administrative compensation 
scheme could allow wronged individuals to receive some redress while 
avoiding many of the complications of a Bivens suit.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, federal courts have repeatedly dismissed suits seeking 
money damages against government officials allegedly responsible for the 
most controversial aspects of the United States’ post-9/11 conflicts and 
counterterrorism policies. The dismissed cases were brought against senior 
federal officials such as the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, FBI 
Director, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their alleged 
involvement in extraordinary rendition leading to torture in Syria, military 
detention of alleged terrorists without judicial review in the United States 
and at Guantanamo Bay, and interrogation abuses in the United States, at 
Guantanamo, in Iraq (at Abu Ghraib prison and elsewhere) and 
Afghanistan (at Bagram and Kandahar detention facilities and elsewhere).1  
Five of the federal circuit courts have held in these cases that it is 
inappropriate to authorize a Bivens2 damages remedy against federal 
officials in suits involving sensitive national security or foreign relations 
issues, even when the plaintiff had no other effective remedy for the 
allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the U.S. government. In other words, 
the courts imposed a broad and perhaps categorical bar on seeking money 
damages against federal officials in suits challenging the constitutionality 
of significant national security or foreign relations activities. 
These five circuit courts emphasized a number of different 
considerations, including separation of powers, namely that the 
Constitution allocates nearly plenary control over most aspects of the 
military, war-fighting, foreign affairs, diplomacy, and intelligence matters 
 
 1. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (suit against the Secretary of 
Defense alleging that he approved or tolerated policies and practices that led to the torture by the U.S. 
military of two U.S. citizen security contractors working in Iraq during the postwar insurgency); Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (suit against the Secretary of Defense alleging that he 
approved the plaintiff’s unjustified detention as a security threat and mistreatment in military custody in 
Iraq during the postwar insurgency); Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2012) (suit by 
Iranian nationals alleging that U.S. FBI and immigration agents lied about their ties to the terrorist 
group MEK to obtain their predeportation detention); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(suit against the Secretary of Defense and other national security officials brought by a U.S. citizen, 
Jose Padilla, and his mother, challenging his designation and detention in the U.S. as an enemy 
combatant, and mistreatment suffered in custody); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (suit 
against the Secretary of Defense and senior Army officers by Afghan and Iraqi nationals challenging 
their mistreatment at U.S. military prisons in those countries during wartime); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (suit brought by a dual citizen of Syria and Canada against the 
Attorney General, the FBI Director, and other officials concerning his extraordinary rendition from the 
U.S. to Syria where he was allegedly tortured); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (suit 
against the Secretary of Defense and other national security officials, challenging the military detention 
and alleged mistreatment of foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay). 
 2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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to Congress and the President;
3
 comparative lack of judicial competence to 
assess legal and policy issues in these fields;
4
 caution about courts 
declaring constitutional rules that will limit or overrule the policy 
judgments of the executive and Congress in the complex and rapidly 
changing environment of national security or interfere with relations with 
foreign countries;
5
 concern that officials would be overdeterred by the 
threat of individual damages liability and thus fail to take aggressive, 
decisive actions necessary to keep the country safe;
6
 concerns about 
judicial manageability and improper disclosure of sensitive or classified 
information;
7
 and caution when a suit challenges how civilian or military 
commanders supervise and deploy the military establishment, especially in 
a war zone.8 
The courts had to decide whether to allow damages suits in these cases 
because, in instances of alleged wrongdoing by federal officials, there has 
never been a statutory equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes 
money damages suits against state and local officials for their constitutional 
torts.
9
 As a result, the Supreme Court was asked, and in the 1971 Bivens 
case, agreed, to recognize a judicially implied cause of action and money 
damages remedy against federal officials under the Constitution itself, in a 
case against federal narcotics officers who allegedly violated the Fourth 
Amendment.10 How far this right to sue should extend has become very 
 
 3. Doe, 683 F.3d at 394, 395; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548–50; Arar, 585 F.3d at 575, 578. 
 4. Vance, 701 F.3d at 199–200; Doe, 683 F.3d at 395; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548, 549; Arar, 585 
F.3d at 575, 578. 
 5. Doe, 683 F.3d at 395–96; Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 982; Arar, 585 F.3d at 580–81; Rasul, 563 
F.3d at 532 n.5. See also Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d 585 F.3d 559 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 6. Doe, 683 F.3d at 395, 396; Ali, 649 F.3d at 773; Arar, 585 F.3d at 578–79. 
 7. Doe, 683 F.3d at 395; Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 983; Arar, 585 F.3d at 576, 578. See also Arar, 
532 F.3d at 181, aff’d 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2010) (en banc); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 710 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). 
 8. Vance, 701 F.3d at 199–200; Doe, 683 F.3d at 395. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 10. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394–97 
(1971). Bivens both recognized a “cause of action” to sue directly under the Fourth Amendment and 
also held that the Constitution and the general federal question jurisdiction statute gave the judiciary 
authority to supply money damages as a “remedy.” Id. at 389, 396, 397. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228, 233–34 (1979) (explaining that Bivens involves two analytically distinct questions—about a 
cause of action and a remedy). But the Court generally does not distinguish between these concepts, and 
in fact, uses them interchangeably, often within the same opinion. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 675 (2009) (describing Bivens as concerning both “an implied private action for damages” and 
“implied damages remedy”); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 367, 374 (1983) (describing Bivens as both 
“a private cause of action for damages” and “a nonstatutory damages remedy”). Because the Court uses 
the terms interchangeably, because the Bivens cause of action is defined by the remedy sought, and 
because it would be unwieldy to say both “remedy” and “cause of action,” whenever I refer to Bivens, I 
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controversial. 
Many commentators have decried the refusal by the courts of appeals 
in the post-9/11 cases to allow a Bivens damages remedy as being 
unfaithful to Supreme Court doctrine, tantamount to judicial abdication of 
the checking and balancing function, a dangerous failure to deter 
unconstitutional conduct by the executive, an unfair refusal to compensate 
some plaintiffs who were indisputably injured, and a departure from a 
presumed norm of allowing courts to choose an appropriate remedy to right 
every unconstitutional wrong.11 Steve Vladeck, for example, has strongly 
criticized what he calls a “national security exception to Bivens” adopted 
by the courts of appeals,12 as have other critics in legal academia, the media 
and at advocacy groups.13 
I share some of the concerns expressed by the critics of these Bivens 
 
too will use the terms interchangeably. I beg the forgiveness of any federal courts purists who might 
find this troublingly imprecise. 
 11. See, e.g., Editorial, A National Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/opinion/11wed1.html (calling the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Arar, “insensitive to the violation of [Arar’s] rights and the courts’ duty to hold government 
accountable for breaches of the law,” and claiming that “[t]he ruling distorts precedent and the 
Constitutional separation of powers to deny justice to Mr. Arar and give officials a pass for egregious 
misconduct”).  
 12. Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound National Security Exception to 
Bivens, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L SEC. L. REP. 1, 1, 4–5 (2006). See also Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National 
Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1330 (2012) [hereinafter Vladeck, Canon]; Stephen I. 
Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255, 258–59 (2010) 
[hereinafter Vladeck, After Iqbal] (arguing that post-9/11 decisions are “inconsistent with the animating 
principles behind Bivens,” and that “the Court completely missed the opportunity to clarify why 
national security concerns might actually counsel in favor of liability, rather than against it”); Carlos M. 
Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511 (2013) (arguing that the courts of appeals “improperly combine[d] two 
problematic features” when determining whether to allow a Bivens action, and that the courts’ 
“conceptualization of the Bivens question as ‘Bivens or nothing’ is decidedly at odds with the way the 
Supreme Court understood the Bivens question in Bivens itself”). 
 13. See, e.g., Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens 
Actions: What is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 720 (2012) (describing courts’ 
misrecognition of the special factors analysis in Bivens cases as having led to to “incongruous 
opinions”); Gwynne L. Skinner, Roadblocks to Remedies: Recently Developed Barriers to Relief for 
Aliens Injured by U.S. Officials, Contrary to the Founders’ Intent, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 555, 622–26 
(2013) (noting the modern departure from the founders’ original intent regarding remedies available for 
foreign citizens, and arguing that the original intent is still relevant today); Jonathan Hafetz, Torture, 
and Impunity in US Courts, ALJAZEERA.COM, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/ 
20121307159326319.html (last modified Jan. 30, 2012) (characterizing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Lebron v. Rumsfeld as “troubling” because, among other things, it “threatens core freedoms protected 
by the constitution”); Ben Wizner, A Question for America About Torture, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS 
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights-national-security/question-america-about-
torture (arguing that the victims of torture have been denied their day in court). 
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decisions.14 But the academic debate, to date, has been almost uniformly 
critical of the limitations on Bivens,15 and thus has failed to illuminate 
some important questions about the role of remedies in litigation against 
government officials in the national security area. Almost no effort has 
been made to sympathetically explain, much less defend, the bar on Bivens 
in national security and foreign affairs cases. 
The refusal to allow the Bivens damages remedy in post-9/11 national 
security cases is both more and less exceptional than critics to date have 
recognized. Nearly thirty years ago, the Supreme Court rejected the claim 
that the U.S. Attorney General should have absolute immunity from a 
Bivens suit for actions taken in what the executive asserted was a national 
security matter.16 But since then, Bivens has been so heavily disfavored by 
the Supreme Court in nearly every context, as have money damages 
remedies more generally, that today, there is almost de facto immunity 
from suit because a cause of action for Bivens is rarely available. Thus, the 
results in the recent national security Bivens cases are less exceptional than 
some suggest because by now, it no longer seems accurate to say that there 
is a specific “national security exception” to Bivens. In a wide range of 
putative Bivens suits involving both ordinary domestic and military 
subjects, the Justices of the Supreme Court have limited Bivens to the very 
few claims and contexts their predecessors approved in an initial burst of 
enthusiasm over thirty years ago—primarily involving domestic law 
enforcement and prison administration.17 
But the refusal to allow Bivens damages remedies in these national 
security cases is exceptional in another sense: the Supreme Court has 
arguably never been more assertive in adjudicating national security and 
 
 14. See Andrew Kent, Just Don’t Ask for Money: Why Won’t Courts Ever Award Damages to the 
Victims of Drone Strikes?, SLATE (July 23, 2012), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2012/07/anwar_al_awlaki_suit_courts_should_award_damages_in_national_security_cas
es_.html (arguing that it should be easier for plaintiffs to seek compensation for wrongs done by 
government officials than to get an injunction). 
 15. For one of the few examples of academic discussion of the Bivens national security cases that 
is not entirely critical of the courts of appeals’ decisions, see Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in 
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 
218–20 (2010). 
 16. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985).  
 17. See infra Part II. The Court has approved only two types of Bivens claims in addition to the 
Fourth Amendment claim in Bivens itself: claims under the equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment alleging gender-based employment discrimination by a 
member of Congress, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 228–29 (1979), and inmates’ claims under the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment against federal prison officials, Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–23 (1980). See also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (describing the two contexts in which the Court extended Bivens claims). 
DO NOT DELETE 9/1/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] BIVENS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 1129 
foreign relations issues than it has in recent years. The last decade saw the 
executive lose (or have its legal arguments offered as amicus curiae 
rejected) time after time in Supreme Court cases concerning questions of 
judicial power and justiciability in foreign relations and national security.18 
In the most high profile of these cases, the ones concerning the post-9/11 
war on terror, the Court emphatically asserted its authority and rejected or 
ignored the notion that deference to the executive was appropriate because 
of the national security or foreign affairs dimensions of the disputes.19 In 
 
 18. See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014) (rejecting the 
executive’s argument as amicus curiae that considerations of international comity counseled against 
court-facilitated discovery of a sovereign’s assets); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 
1421, 1424–25 (2012) (rejecting the executive’s argument that challenge to its refusal on Article II 
grounds to comply with a congressional statute regarding U.S. passports and the status of Jerusalem was 
a nonjusticiable political question); Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) (rejecting the 
executive’s argument that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise a federalism challenge to a treaty); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (holding unconstitutional a congressional statute 
stripping jurisdiction over habeas petitions of persons detained by the executive at Guantanamo Bay as 
alleged enemy combatants); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 497–99 (2008) (holding that the President 
lacked authority to order state courts to reconsider criminal convictions that, according to a decision of 
the International Court of Justice, violated defendants’ treaty-based rights); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
US 557, 566–67 (2006) (holding that the executive’s military commission violated statutes and 
international law); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470, 483–85 (2004) (rejecting the executive’s 
argument that habeas statute did not reach persons detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay); 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88, 699–700 (2001) (holding that the court had jurisdiction over 
habeas petitions challenging postremoval period detention and that an indefinite detention under 
immigration statutes of an alien deemed removable but who lacked a country willing to accept him was 
unconstitutional); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–05, 314 (2001) (rejecting the executive’s 
arguments and construing a statute to allow judicial review via habeas of an alien subject to deportation 
because a withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction would raise serious constitutional questions under the 
Suspension Clause). 
Other important cases about judicial power or justiciability in foreign affairs and national security 
contexts can be counted as partial losses for the executive. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren 553 U.S. 674, 
685–88, 705 (2008) (rejecting the executive’s argument that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over 
the habeas petition from a detainee in Iraq, but vacating injunction entered by the lower court against 
the executive); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516–17, 526–27 (2004) (agreeing with the executive 
that it had authority to detain a U.S. citizen as enemy combatant, but rejecting the executive’s view that 
only extremely minimal procedural due process was warranted). 
As Ingrid Wuerth has emphasized, the Court has recently declined to give deference to the executive’s 
interpretation of statutes and statutory presumptions in several important cases involving foreign 
relations issues. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Bond Case, Statutory Interpretation, and the Executive Branch, 
LAWFARE (June 8, 2014), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/the-bond-case-statutory-interpretation-
and-the-executive-branch/ (citing Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)). 
The executive branch also won some victories in foreign relations and national security cases raising 
issues of judicial power or justiciability. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 
1142–43 (2013) (finding that challengers to the executive’s foreign intelligence wiretapping lacked 
standing); Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–85 (2010) (affirming the executive’s authority to 
determine immunity from suit of foreign heads of state).  
 19. See George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit”—the Bivens Impasse, 82 
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these war-on-terror cases, as well as in other national security or foreign 
relations contexts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled against the 
executive and, in so doing, approved judicial review of the executive’s 
national security actions, in suits where plaintiffs sought prospective, 
injunctive-type remedies against the government.20 Remedies of that type 
are typically thought to involve much more judicial intrusion into executive 
functioning than would a retrospective award of money damages,21 and in 
some instances, injunctive-type remedies were implied by the courts from a 
jurisdictional statute or said to be required by the Constitution itself, rather 
than being expressly created by Congress,
22
 making the questions of 
separation of powers and judicial authority even more acute. In addition, 
the war-on-terror decisions in Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene 
were intended by the Court to have, and did in fact have, enormously 
significant practical effects—restructuring the worldwide interrogation, 
detention, and military commission policies of the executive branch.23 
Many critics who think the judiciary has not done enough to remedy the 
perceived excesses in the war on terror are missing the larger picture of 
unprecedented judicial assertiveness and effectiveness.24  
 
S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 898 (2009) (stating that in the war on terror habeas cases, “the Court’s normal 
deference to the political branches . . . disappeared”); Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations 
Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 122 (2011) (“[I]n every major case arising out of 
9/11, the Court has rejected the position staked out by the executive branch, even when supported by 
Congress. At critical points, moreover, each of these rejections involved the Court reclaiming its 
primacy in legal interpretation . . . .”). 
 20. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (habeas); Munaf, 553 U.S. at 680 (habeas); Hamdan, 548 U.S. 
at 567 (habeas); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470 (habeas); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (habeas); Webster v. Doe, 486 
U.S. 592, 594 (1988) (injunction); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972) 
(mandamus); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 501–05 (1964) (injunction and declaratory 
judgment); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) (declaratory judgment); Kent v. Dulles, 357 
U.S. 116, 129–30 (1958) (declaratory judgment); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 582, 589 (1952) (injunction and declaratory judgment); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 
307 (1946) (habeas). 
The Court has vacated or disapproved of injunctions granted by lower courts in national security cases 
where the Court believed the requirements for equitable relief had not been met. E.g., Winter v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32–33 (2008); Munaf, 553 U.S. at 705. 
Lower federal courts have also sometimes treated requests for injunctions in the national security or 
foreign affairs area with caution. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 511, 516 (D.C. Cir. 
2009); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.). 
 21. Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and 
Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1329 (2001). 
 22. John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constituional Cases, 22 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 38–42 (2013). 
 23. See infra Part IV.B. 
 24. For example, many assert that Boumediene has been “gutted” by the D.C. Circuit because no 
habeas petitioners have won on the merits there and been granted release. But, as Benjamin Wittes 
explains: “[T]he Guantanamo litigation remains very consequential, despite the government’s winning 
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But quite plainly, the federal courts do not forcefully confront the 
executive in national security and foreign affairs cases at all times or in all 
contexts. The courts frequently say that judicial review is least appropriate 
in these areas,25 and the courts’ actual behavior often evidences real 
caution.26 By all appearances, the courts think carefully about which cases 
to decide on the merits and how to resolve them. A very important 
question, then, is why courts choose to intervene in the national security 
and foreign affairs area in some types of cases but not others. Views about 
different remedies may help explain.  
Why now—when the Supreme Court has approved the use of 
intrusive, often judicially created, injunctive-type remedies to review, 
restrain, and restructure the executive’s and Congress’s conduct of national 
security and foreign affairs,27 and when the Court more generally seems 
committed as never before to a strong version of judicial supremacy in both 
domestic and foreign affairs contexts28—have the appellate courts, with the 
blessing of the Supreme Court,29 been unwilling to allow Bivens suits for 
 
streak at the D.C. Circuit. A lot of detainees have been freed because of court orders the government did 
not appeal. More still have been freed in anticipation of habeas litigation the government did not feel 
confident defending. In more cases still, the government had to consider very seriously whether its 
evidence would or would not stand up in court, and thus had to think long and hard about the merits of 
detentions.” Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on the Cert Denials, LAWFARE (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/thoughts-on-the-cert-denials/. 
 25. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (suggesting that the courts generally give 
“heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national 
security”); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (“Matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign 
relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely 
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.’” (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 
(1952))). 
 26. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (applying the 
presumption against extraterritorial application to limit the reach of the Alien Tort Statute because of 
“the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy”). 
 27. Although, as many critics have noted, the Court’s post-9/11 cases have not actually resulted 
in the court-ordered release of any detainees, the response to the Court rulings by Congress and the 
executive have caused many detainees to be released, and many aspects of the government’s national 
security policies to be dramatically restructured in rights-protective ways. See supra notes 23–24 and 
accompanying text. 
 28. A number of commentators have noted an increasing posture of judicial supremacy at the 
Supreme Court, with both a vertical dimension, in which the Court “seeks to ensure and expand its 
hierarchical superiority in our judicial system” by giving it “the final say when any other court, state or 
federal, rules on the constitutionality of government conduct,” Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding 
Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 669 (2012), and a 
horizontal dimension, namely that the Court “alone among the three branches has been allocated the 
power to provide the full substantive meaning of all constitutional provisions,” Rachel E. Barkow, More 
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240–41 (2002). 
 29. The Court has denied certiorari in every post-9/11 national security case where a Bivens 
DO NOT DELETE 9/1/2014  5:18 PM 
1132 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87: 1123 
money damages in the national security area?  
Thus, this Article asks, are damages different, and if so, why? 
Answering these questions turns out to be a complicated endeavor, raising 
fundamental questions about the ways in which the judiciary has 
participated over the course of our history in restraining the activities of the 
other branches of government within bounds of the law. 
Several possible explanations for the courts’ remedial preferences are 
insufficient—not wrong, but insufficient. The decisions rejecting Bivens in 
national security and foreign affairs cases might be examples of the 
phenomenon that occurs during threats and emergencies, in which the 
federal courts fail to protect individual rights and defer too much to the 
government.30 They might evidence what a number of commentators see as 
a larger trend of the courts’ increasing “hostility to litigation,”31 including 
to civil rights and civil liberties litigation against government.
32
 They might 
simply be part of a general trend of the courts disfavoring damages 
remedies or being reluctant to authorize remedies not approved by 
Congress. They might show that the courts see a greater need for judicial 
intervention when the alleged constitutional violation is ongoing or 
threatened as opposed to completed, as it must be for standing to exist in 
injunctive and habeas cases. They might result from the fact that plaintiffs 
who qualify for injunctive or habeas relief will generally be perceived by 
the judiciary to be legally “innocent,” while damages plaintiffs could well 
be “guilty,” and therefore, less sympathetic.33 The courts may implicitly 
agree with John Jeffries’ thesis that doctrines minimizing officials’ 
 
remedy was rejected. See Mirmehdi v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2336 (2013); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 133 
S. Ct. 2796 (2013); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012); Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409 
(2010); Wilson v. Libby, 129 S. Ct. 2825 (2009). Doe v. Rumsfeld has not reached a final judgment. 
There does not appear to have been a certiorari petition filed in Ali v. Rumsfeld. Originally, the Court 
vacated the decision in Rasul v. Myers in light of Boumediene v. Bush, see Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 
1083, 1083 (2008), but when the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Bivens claims on remand, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, see Rasul v. Myers, 558 U.S. 1091, 1901 (2009). 
 30. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War 
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2005) (surveying the literature and concluding that “the belief that the 
Court acts to suppress rights and liberties under conditions of threat is so widely accepted in post-
September 11 America, and has been so widely accepted since the World War I period, that most 
observers no longer debate whether the Court, in fact, behaves in this way”). 
 31. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1107–08 (2006). 
 32. See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted 
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (“Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court (and in 
recent years, the Congress) has restricted civil rights remedies through a series of complex and 
controversial measures.”). 
 33. Thanks to Jonathan Hafetz for the observations in this and the prior sentence. 
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damages liability—he was focused primarily on qualified immunity—spur 
the desirable development of constitutional law by lowering the cost of 
ruling against the government.34 Or the Bivens decisions might be 
explained by the fact that, by virtue of their backgrounds and method of 
their selection, federal judges are very likely to have views on important 
legal and policy matters that are “acceptable to a majority, or indeed a 
supermajority, of the officeholders in the political branches.”35 
While many or perhaps all of these factors likely play a role, they 
cannot fully account for the courts’ behavior in the Bivens cases. As noted, 
the Supreme Court has not been deferential in the post-9/11 habeas cases, 
and has ruled against the executive repeatedly and assertively in national 
security and foreign relations litigation in recent years, generally in cases 
seeking injunctive-type remedies,
36
 and at times in favor of claimants who 
hardly qualified for judicial sympathy, for instance, because of admitted 
involvement with al Qaeda,
37
 or because they were convicted felons.38 
 
 34. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 
(1999). 
 35. Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 1023–24 (2004) (making this 
argument in the area of race discrimination). Thanks to Alexander Reinert for this observation. 
 36. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 37. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 569 (2006). 
 38. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001). I 
recognize that many observers, including a number of my colleagues who read earlier drafts of this 
Article, would dispute the claim that the Court has intervened forcefully in national security cases in 
recent years. Because this claim is important to my argument, I want to explain why I think that 
description is justified based on Hamdan and Boumediene. As David Cole has noted, Boumediene did 
three things that put the Court in unprecedented conflict with Congress and the President: 
First, for the first time in its history, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law 
enacted by Congress and signed by the president on an issue of military policy in a time of 
armed conflict. . . . Second, and also for the first time, the Court extended constitutional 
protections to noncitizens outside U.S. territory during wartime. . . . Third, the Court declared 
unconstitutional a law restricting federal court jurisdiction. . . . Only on two prior occasions 
has the Court actually declared a jurisdiction-stripping law unconstitutional, and on both 
occasions it found reasons for doing so that were independent of the pure question of 
jurisdiction. 
David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2008 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 47–49 (citations omitted). The Court in both cases suggested that military 
detention of alleged enemy fighters held outside the sovereign territory of the United States was 
essentially per se lawless if Article III courts did not bless it, see infra notes 171–172 and 
accompanying text, even though the Court’s case law and historical practice of the U.S. government 
had never required that. See generally Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s 
Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101 (2011) [hereinafter Kent, Insular Cases]; 
Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the 
Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 150 (2013) [hereinafter Kent, Enemy Fighters]. Also in 
Hamdan, the Court failed to defer to the President’s exercise of statutorily delegated rulemaking 
authority or his plausible interpretation of a law-of-war treaty, without discussing case law that would 
seem to have required, or at least recommended deference in both cases. Julian Ku & John Yoo, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 
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Moreover, federal courts routinely issue injunctions against federal officials 
without worrying that they have implied their right to do so from a mere 
grant by Congress of federal subject matter jurisdiction.39 As explored 
below, the recent rejection of Bivens has deep historical roots in the growth 
of the administrative state overseen by judges wielding injunctive-type 
remedies and the concomitant decline of the traditional tort suit as the 
mechanism for restraining federal official misconduct.
40
 But there is no 
categorical bar on damages suits against wayward officials in ordinary, 
domestic cases. The lower courts’ refusal, consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s doctrines and preferences, to allow Bivens in the national security 
and foreign affairs area is much more pronounced and acute than the 
general historical trend toward injunctive-type remedies. There is 
something different about damages generally and even more so in the 
national security and foreign affairs area. 
To begin this project of answering whether and how damages are 
different from other remedies, we must broaden the scope of the analysis. 
The post-9/11 Bivens cases cannot be understood by reference to Bivens 
doctrine or the law of remedies alone. An important premise of this Article 
is that Richard Fallon’s “doctrinal equilibration thesis,” concerning how the 
courts restrain governmental misconduct, is descriptively correct.41 
Fallon’s thesis is that the courts self-consciously seek to obtain the 
outcomes they view as consistent with the best understanding of legal 
materials like the Constitution and policy goals by adjusting the many 
different levers available, seeking, in his words, “an acceptable overall 
alignment of doctrines” involving remedies, substantive constitutional 
rights, justiciability, causes of action, pleading and proof standards, and 
immunity.42 These are all best understood as “flexible and potentially 
adjustable components of a package of rights and enforcement mechanisms 
that should be viewed, and assessed for desirability, as a whole.”43  
Limitations on Bivens cannot be assessed either descriptively or 
normatively without understanding the whole package of doctrines and 
 
CONST. COMMENT. 179, 194–99 (2006). 
 39. Preis, supra note 22, at 39–40, 53. 
 40. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 41. The term “equilibration” does not imply the existence of a normatively attractive 
equilibrium. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 637 n.11 (2006). 
 42. Id. at 637. 
 43. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 479, 480 (2011). As Fallon acknowledges, other scholars have made similar or related points 
about the Court’s equilibration of different doctrines. Id. at 482 n.13. 
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practices that interact with each other in complex ways to achieve the 
courts’ goals of keeping other branches of government within the bounds of 
the law. And anyone advocating that courts broadly allow Bivens suits in 
national security and foreign relations cases—as many commentators 
do
44—must account not only for the current equilibration, but also for how 
the courts would likely change related doctrines to accommodate the policy 
goals and preserve the institutional relationships that the limitations on 
Bivens presently serve. 
This Article attempts to understand the doctrinal equilibration that the 
courts have developed in the national security litigation context, of which 
the limitation on Bivens is a part. The Supreme Court’s view of the nature 
of its judicial role has shifted dramatically over time, and there have been 
accompanying shifts in its preference for different types of remedies in 
litigation against the government. Inverting its traditional practices, the 
Court now prefers other remedies instead of money damages for 
enforcement of constitutional and other law against the government in all 
contexts, not just national security. The modern Court’s preferred remedy 
is not actually a traditional remedy at all—it is the Court’s ability to 
announce rules and doctrines of constitutional and subconstitutional law in 
its published opinions and be confident that the executive branch will treat 
the opinions as legally binding in all relevant contexts. The Court has thus 
shifted away from its traditional role as resolver of individual disputes and 




Viewing law declaration as a system-wide injunctive-type remedy 
shows how money damages suits can also be vehicles for courts to control 
government functioning prospectively and system-wide. As a result, the 
distinction between injunctions and damages is not as great as it may first 
appear. But still, the Supreme Court is particularly loath to allow a 
damages remedy against federal officials in national security and foreign 
relations cases, and courts of appeals have followed its lead.
46
 
One reason for the Court’s view of damages remedies is clear—it has 
repeatedly stated in many contexts that it believes that damages liability for 
officials causes “overdeterrence”—the failure of officials to vigorously and 
efficiently perform socially beneficial functions because of their fear of 
personal damages liability. The Court has also expressed concerns about 
 
 44. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 45. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 46. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
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the unique burdens of discovery, especially on senior policymakers, 
imposed by Bivens suits as opposed to other types of litigation against the 
government. These concerns seem likely to be particularly pronounced in 
the national security and foreign affairs areas.
47
 
Other reasons the courts might disfavor damages can be discerned, but 
they are not explicitly stated by the judiciary. Guessing at unstated motives 
is difficult and perhaps unwise. The Supreme Court, as the saying goes, is a 
“they” not an “it.”48 This is even more true when we broaden the focus to 
the entire federal judiciary. The individuals who compose the Court and the 
judiciary as a whole change frequently and hence, ideological and legal 
views of judges change. In addition, many internal and external factors 
might influence the way individual judges vote and write such that offering 
conjectures and making generalizations about their motivations could be 
imprudently speculative. So I will offer some thoughts about potential 
reasons that might defend or justify the Court’s disapproval of money 
damages suits in the national security and foreign affairs areas, with the 
explicit caveat that I am not claiming to know or predict the inner thoughts 
and motivations of the various judges involved.  
There are several such reasons. A much greater pool of potential 
plaintiffs can bring a suit seeking money damages compared to an 
injunction or habeas, particularly in the national security and foreign 
relations areas. As a result, allowing Bivens suits will vastly increase the 
potential for constitutional litigation against the government, raising docket 
concerns as well as increasing the potential for interbranch conflict and 
judicial involvement in sensitive areas often thought to be the domain of 
the President and Congress.
49
 
Damages suits pose unique risks of interbranch conflict for another 
reason: Bivens litigation is outside the control of the executive branch.
50
 
When only defensive suits or claims seeking injunctions, habeas corpus, or 
exclusionary rule remedies are allowed, the government can control 
whether these claims proceed by deciding whether to initiate or discontinue 
the legal proceedings or government action that gave rise to the suits or 
claims.51 Bivens suits cannot be headed off in this manner, because private 
individuals can choose whether to sue, and they can sue for tort damages 
 
 47. See infra Part VI.A–B. 
 48. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An 
Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 375–77, 376 n.94 (2010). 
 49. See infra Part VI.D.2. 
 50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 51. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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whether or not they are still detained or still subject to other government 
coercion, such as a criminal prosecution. 
This expanded volume of litigation outside the control of the 
executive that allows Bivens in national security and foreign relations 
contexts would require the courts to frequently make difficult judgments 
about how and whether to transplant detailed rights-protective norms of 
constitutional law developed in domestic, peacetime contexts into the much 
different world of extraterritorial national security and foreign relations 
activities. The Supreme Court and courts of appeals seem cautious in the 
face of this prospect.
52
 
And finally, the courts seem likely to be aware that, especially in the 
national security area, there have developed in the last decade an 
extraordinary range of mechanisms for maintaining the rule of law within 
the executive branch—everything from independent inspectors general 
within executive agencies to an aggressive investigative press receiving an 
ever-growing number of leaks from current and former officials, to the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)53 litigation and public shaming of 
lawbreaking officials at which nonprofit organizations have become adept. 
With all of these other accountability mechanisms working more 
vigorously than ever before, and more vigorously in this area than in many 
other areas of government operations, a Bivens damages remedy might 




This Article proceeds in five major parts. Part II outlines the rise and 
decline of Bivens at the Supreme Court, and discusses the Court’s views 
about national security litigation against government officials. Part III 
defends the courts of appeals which have barred Bivens in post-9/11 
national security and foreign affairs cases from the chorus of critics who 
charge that the circuit courts have misapplied Supreme Court doctrine. Part 
III also preemptively answers a potential response to this project: that 
Bivens is so toothless in every context that there is nothing interesting 
happening in national security and foreign relations cases. 
Part IV begins the project of contextualizing the Court’s remedies 
doctrines by outlining the Court’s preferred role as a law declaring 
institution interested in securing the rule of law system-wide, rather than as 
an individual dispute solver and redress provider. 
 
 52. See infra Part VI.E. 
 53. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 54. See infra Part VI.C. 
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Part V turns back to earlier periods of American history to provide 
additional context for the modern Court’s preference for constitutional 
litigation employing injunctions and law declaration to restrain the 
government instead of the traditional mechanism that prevailed in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—the common law tort 
suit. Part VI discusses several potential reasons why damages cases are 
especially disfavored in national security and foreign relations cases. 
The Conclusion, Part VII, notes one significant cost of barring 
Bivens—some severely mistreated, innocent individuals are denied any 
remedy at all—and briefly suggests that an administrative compensation 
scheme to give innocent victims some redress is worth considering. 
II.  THE RISE AND DECLINE OF BIVENS AT THE SUPREME COURT  
To assess the role of the federal courts in post-9/11 national security 
litigation, it is necessary to understand the nature and trajectory over time 
of the Bivens remedy. As this part demonstrates, the Bivens remedy today 
is strongly “disfavored,”55 and the Supreme Court probably views it as 
available in only three circumstances: Fourth Amendment claims against 
law enforcement personnel, employment discrimination claims against 
federal employers under the equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause, and Eighth Amendment claims against federal prison 
officials. In addition, the Court has implied several times that it will be 
exceedingly reluctant to extend Bivens into national security and foreign 
affairs contexts. 
A.  THE BIVENS DECISION AND EARLY EXPANSION 
In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized an implied right under 
the Fourth Amendment to sue federal officials for money damages.56 
Webster Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents broke into his house 
without probable cause and mistreated him in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.57 For this one-time event, an injunction was not available. 
The government did not pursue a prosecution, so the exclusionary rule 
provided no relief. As Justice Harlan said in concurrence, “[f]or people in 
Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”58  
 
 55. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). 
 56. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971). 
 57. Id. at 389–90. 
 58. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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The U.S. government argued that Mr. Bivens could sue for damages, 
but only under state tort law, which it viewed as the traditional remedy for 
misconduct by a federal official.59 The Court rejected state tort law as the 
exclusive avenue of relief. Over the course of the twentieth century, the 
Fourth Amendment had come to protect broader interests than those 
recognized under state tort law, and state law may be “inconsistent or even 
hostile” to federal rights, posing problems of federal supremacy.60 
Moreover, since the Court had implied a right to sue federal officials for 
injunctive relief under the Constitution and the federal question 
jurisdictional statute,61 and also implied rights to sue under some federal 
statutes, it would not be unprecedented or unusual to imply a money 
damages remedy here, especially since “[h]istorically, damages have been 
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in 
liberty.”62 
The Court added two potential caveats which might be present in other 
cases and that would counsel against finding an implied damages remedy 
for constitutional torts: there might be, but was not in Mr. Bivens’ case, 
“another remedy, equally effective” provided by Congress, and there might 
be, but were not here, “special factors counseling hesitation” about whether 
the Court should infer a remedy “in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress.”63 Deference to Congress was hence part of the Bivens doctrine 
from the outset. 
Within the decade, the Court extended Bivens to allow suits against 
federal officials under two additional constitutional provisions—the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
in a gender-based employment discrimination suit against a 
Congressman,64 and the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment in an inmate’s case against federal prison officials.65 At the 
time, it seemed likely that the Court would keep expanding Bivens until it 
became the substantial equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.66 
 
 59. Id. at 390–91 (majority opinion). 
 60. Id. at 391–95. See also id. at 408–09 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 61. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1968); Phila. Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 
619–20 (1912) (“[I]n case of an injury threatened by his illegal action, the officer cannot claim 
immunity from injunction process.”). 
 62. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–96. See also id. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 396–97 (majority opinion). 
 64. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 228–29 (1979). 
 65. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–23 (1980). 
 66. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for 
the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010) (showing that initially, it was widely 
assumed among lower courts and commentators that Bivens remedies would be available for all 
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B.  THE MECHANICS OF SUING IN TORT FOR FEDERAL OFFICIAL 
MISCONDUCT  
Because of sovereign immunity, federal officials are sued under 
Bivens in their so-called personal, rather than official, capacities.67 In 
theory, persons injured by actions of a federal official could also seek 
compensation by suing the agent’s employer, the United States 
government, for damages, but the sovereign immunity of the federal 
government blocks this route.68 The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 
originally enacted in 1946 and frequently amended since,69 effects a partial 
waiver of sovereign immunity by allowing suits directly against the federal 
government instead of officers (who might be judgment proof), and making 
the United States liable for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act 
or omission of any federal employee acting within the scope of his or her 
employment, in accordance with the law of the state where the act or 
omission occurred.70 Under the Westfall Act of 1988,
71
 the FTCA is the 
exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal officials within the scope 
of their employment, except for suits brought for violations of the 
Constitution.72 In other words, state law tort claims against individual 
official defendants are now generally barred. 
The Supreme Court takes the prospect of individual liability in 
damages for officials very seriously and has crafted immunity doctrines to 
soften the blow. The Court’s rulings provide the President of the United 
States and certain classes of officials defined functionally—prosecutors 
doing prosecutorial work, legislators legislating, judges doing judicial 
work, and certain persons performing “quasi-judicial” functions—with 
absolute immunity from money damages suits, generally for the reason that 
such suits would likely be frequent, frequently meritless, and uniquely 
capable of disrupting job performance.73 All other government officials are 
 
constitutional rights). 
 67. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238, 247–48 (1974) (holding that sovereign immunity 
does not bar a suit for damages against an official in his or her personal capacity). 
 68. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 841–42 (6th ed. 2009). 
 69. Federal Tort Claims Act, Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47; Act of June 25, 
1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 982–85 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). But the FTCA did not waive sovereign immunity for suits alleging 
violations of the Constitution. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994). 
 71. Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2621 et seq.). 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b). 
 73. FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 998–1002. 
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entitled only to a “qualified immunity” from money damages suits.74 Under 
the qualified immunity doctrine, officials are liable only when they violate 
“clearly established” federal rights, that is, when “‘[t]he contours of [a] 
right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”75  
Because qualified immunity is not just a defense to liability, but also 
“a limited ‘entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 
litigation,’”76 the Court’s doctrine encourages speedy resolution of 
immunity questions by judges.
77
 The policy reasons for the Court’s active 
protection of federal officials through a robust immunity doctrine, 
including fear of dampening the zeal with which officials perform their 
jobs because of fear of personal liability, are discussed below in Part VI.A. 
C.  RETRENCHMENT OF BIVENS 
After Davis v. Passman in 1979 and Carlson v. Green in 1980,
78
 the 
Court stopped the expansion of Bivens, and instead, in a long series of 
cases, has refused to extend Bivens to any new contexts, new constitutional 
provisions, or new types of defendants, based on the two caveats in Bivens: 
that a Bivens remedy should be withheld if Congress has created an 
effective alternate remedial scheme, or if there are other “special factors 
counseling hesitation” by the judiciary.79 Since 1980, the Court has refused 
to extend Bivens at least eight times, and in those and other cases, has 
counseled hesitation and expressed doubts about the Bivens enterprise.80 In 
 
 74. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 75. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 76. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 
(1985)). 
 77. See e.g., Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27. 
 78. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 79. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–97 
(1971). Although Davis had recognized a Bivens remedy for due process violations concerning sex-
based employment discrimination, the Court has several times made clear that “a Bivens action alleging 
a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may be appropriate in some 
circumstances, but not in others.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 n.9 (1994). 
 80. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623–26 (2012) (refusing to allow a Bivens remedy under 
the Eighth Amendment against employees of a private prison contracting with the federal government); 
Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1848 (2010) (holding that Congress had precluded Bivens claims 
against individual Public Health Service employees and instead required that such suits be brought 
under the FTCA); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550, 561–62 (2007) (refusing to allow a Bivens 
claim by a property owner who alleged that U.S. Bureau of Land Management officials had retaliated 
against him in violation of the First Amendment when he refused the government’s demand for an 
easement); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68–69 (2001) (refusing to allow Bivens claim 
against a government contractor); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994) (holding that Bivens 
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a 2001 decision declining to extend Bivens, the Court stated that Bivens 
was available only “in limited circumstances,” that Bivens was not 
available “simply for want of any other means for challenging a 
constitutional deprivation in federal court,” and that “[s]ince Carlson we 
have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or 
new category of defendants.”81 In 2007, the Court noted that a Bivens 
remedy “is not an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there 
may be to vindicate a protected interest, and in most instances we have 
found a Bivens remedy unjustified.”82 And in 2009 in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
which arose out of the federal investigation of the 9/11 attacks, the Court 
stated that the Bivens remedy, like all judicially-implied causes of action, is 
“disfavored.”83  
To date, William Brennan is the only Justice to ever have authored a 
majority opinion squarely holding that a previously unrecognized Bivens 
remedy is available.84 In recent decades, Justices at the center and left of 
the ideological spectrum have expressed caution or even skepticism about 
Bivens,85 while Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia have written 
 
was not available for a claim by a former bank employee against a federal banking agency alleging he 
lost his job due to agency action that violated the Due Process Clause); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 
412, 414, 425 (1988) (holding that Bivens was not available for claims that Social Security disability 
benefits had been denied in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because an elaborate administrative 
scheme provided a meaningful alternative remedy and signaled Congress’s exclusive control of the 
area); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681–84 (1987) (refusing to allow a former Army 
servicemember to use Bivens—presumably by invoking the substantive due process component of the 
Fifth Amendment—to sue the military and civilian personnel who secretly gave him LSD in a 
disturbing medical experiment); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298–304 (1983) (refusing to allow 
Bivens to be used by Navy enlisted men to sue superior officers for race discrimination under the Due 
Process Clause because there were “special factors counseling hesitation” in creating a damages remedy 
not authorized by Congress); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (refusing to allow a First 
Amendment suit by a NASA engineer against his supervisors because the federal employment 
relationship was “governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions” created by 
Congress, which gave “meaningful remedies against the United States”). 
 81. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67, 68, 69. 
 82. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
 83. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). 
 84. Justice Brennan was the author of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. The only other justices to have 
ever joined a majority opinion squarely holding that a previously unrecognized Bivens remedy is 
available are Justices William Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John 
Stevens, and Potter Stewart. 
 85. Justice David Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, suggested that a Bivens remedy is “a novel rule that a proponent has a burden to justify 
affirmatively on policy grounds in every context in which it might arguably be recognized.” Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 177 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy wrote Iqbal, Justice Breyer wrote Minneci (an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy, Sonia 
Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and others), Justice Sotomayor wrote for a unanimous Court in Hui, Justices 
Souter wrote Wilkie (an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer and others), Justice Stevens wrote 
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separately to indicate their hostility to Bivens, calling it “a relic of the 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create 
causes of action,” and suggesting that the remedy be forever limited to the 
specific claims and contexts where it was previously recognized in Bivens, 
Davis, and Carlson.86 
The fact that damages under Bivens would be the only possible way to 
remedy a wrong is relevant, but is not itself enough to cause the Court to 
extend Bivens.87 Though the Court has never denied a Bivens remedy in a 
case where the plaintiff had no other means to obtain some partial redress, 
or at least make a complaint,88 it has denied Bivens remedies in cases where 
the plaintiff had no other means of judicial redress.89 
Given this parade of decisions and the broad language, which points to 
limiting and disapproving Bivens, it is no wonder that some commentators 
have questioned whether Bivens is on the path to extinction.90 But there 
 
Bush (an opinion joined by Justice Brennan, among others), and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote 
Schweiker, showing that it is not just the Justices on the far right who have voiced or agreed with 
reasons for not extending Bivens. Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion in Meyer was unanimous. Justice 
Hugo Black dissented in Bivens itself. 
 86. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). See also Minneci v. 
Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 
568 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.). Although these justices have been more outspoken on 
the issue than others, it seems overwhelmingly likely that their view—that Bivens should not be 
extended—commands majority support on the Court today. It is hard to imagine that Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito do not share broadly similar views about Bivens with Justices Scalia 
and Thomas. 
 87. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (stating that a Bivens remedy “is not an automatic entitlement no 
matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest”); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 
473, 479 (1994) (denying a Bivens suit in a case where U.S. agency defendant had sovereign 
immunity); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) (finding it “irrelevant . . . whether the 
laws currently on the books afford Stanley, or any other particular serviceman, an ‘adequate’ federal 
remedy for his injuries”). 
 88. See Vladeck, Canon, supra note 12, at 1304. 
 89. This occurred in Chappell, Stanley, Bush, and Chilicky. See, e.g., Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683. 
 90. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without 
Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 26 (“[T]he best that can be said of the 
Bivens doctrine is that it is on life support with little prospect of recovery.”). 
Simply describing the myriad cases in which the Court has held that a Bivens remedy will not be 
allowed does not give an adequate picture of the Court’s reluctance to extend Bivens. In a number of 
cases which it resolved on other grounds, the Court noted that it was assuming without deciding that a 
Bivens remedy was proper, rather than holding that it was. E.g., Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 
(2014) (First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 
n.4 (2012) (First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) 
(First Amendment free exercise claim); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 n.27 (1982) (First 
Amendment employment retaliation claim); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 820 n.36 (1982) 
(same); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 n.8 (1978) (First Amendment and Due Process claims 
based on retaliation); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 309, 325 (1973) (invasion of privacy claim). It 
would have been easy for the Court to recognize Bivens remedies in some or all of these cases had it 
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does not appear to be support on the Court, even from Justices Thomas or 
Scalia, for overruling Bivens entirely.91 Thousands of Bivens suits are still 
filed every year, primarily against federal law enforcement officials under 
the Fourth Amendment, or federal prison officials under the Eighth 
Amendment.92  
D.  BIVENS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS CONTEXTS 
The Supreme Court has strongly hinted that it will be especially 
reluctant to extend Bivens into the national security and foreign affairs 
areas, in large part because the Court views Congress and the executive as 
having constitutionally based predominance there, and believes that judicial 
scrutiny would be excessively costly. It seemed clearly relevant to the 
Court in Iqbal that the defendants in the putative Bivens suit were the 
Attorney General of the United States and the FBI director, both of whom 
were charged with violating the Constitution during the law enforcement 
operations in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
93
 Chappell v. 
Wallace and United States v. Stanley refused to allow Bivens suits against 
military officials on separation of powers grounds.94  
 
desired to. In one recent case, the Court appeared to hold that Bivens extended to a specific First 
Amendment claim—that a non-prosecutor government official, acting in retaliation of the plaintiff’s 
First Amendment protected speech, successfully induced a prosecutor to initiate criminal charges for 
which there was no probable cause. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). But later the Court 
twice stated that it has never approved a Bivens First Amendment claim. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 n.4; 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. 
 91. The Justices seem content to refuse to extend Bivens to any new substantive claims or 
categories of defendants. The Court has frequently decided cases involving Fourth Amendment Bivens 
claims without calling into doubt whether such a claim is allowed. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. 
Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding that a government official is entitled to qualified immunity against a 
Bivens action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563–65 (2004) 
(holding that qualified immunity does not apply to a government official who knowingly violated the 
Fourth Amendment in a Bivens action); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 636–37 (1987) (deciding 
the question of whether a federal law enforcement officer who violated the Fourth Amendment may be 
held personally liable). In Iqbal, the Court impliedly approved the plaintiff’s Bivens claims under the 
Fifth Amendment’s equal protection component, based on Davis v. Passman. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. 
Carlson’s holding that federal prison officials can be sued for Eighth Amendment violations, Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–20 (1980), also seems safe, at least for now. See Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 622–24 
(noting the availability of such a suit); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830–32 (1994) (allowing such 
a suit). 
 92. William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and 
its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1151 & n.297 (1996). 
Lower federal courts have approved Bivens remedies for a wider range of constitutional rights. See, e.g., 
Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A] federal cause of action for damages may 
be implied directly from the [F]irst [A]mendment.”). 
 93. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666, 675–77. 
 94. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300–02 (1983) (finding that the Constitution gave 
Congress “plenary” control over the system of military discipline; that Congress had “established a 
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And there are additional cases which did not involve actual holdings 
about extending Bivens but that contained important dicta speaking against 
recognizing Bivens remedies on behalf of foreign citizens challenging 
extraterritorial national security activities of the U.S. government. In 
Christopher v. Harbury, a suit against CIA, State Department, and National 
Security Council officials concerning alleged U.S.-authored misconduct in 
Guatemala’s civil war, the Court implied that it would exercise caution on 
separation of powers grounds about interfering with foreign affairs 
functions of the executive before finding available a Bivens cause of 
action.95 
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a criminal case involving a 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule issue about a search of a Mexican 
citizen’s residence in Mexico by the Drug Enforcement Administration in 
cooperation with Mexican law enforcement, the Court cited the potential 
for Bivens suits as a reason to not recognize extraterritorial constitutional 
rights for noncitizens:  
Not only are history and case law against respondent, but . . . the result 
of accepting his claim would have significant and deleterious 
consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its 
boundaries. The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals would apply not 
only to law enforcement operations abroad, but also to other foreign 
policy operations which might result in “searches or 
seizures.” . . . Application of the Fourth Amendment to those 
circumstances could significantly disrupt the ability of the political 
branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest. 
Were respondent to prevail, aliens with no attachment to this country 
 
comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military life, taking into account the special 
patterns that define the military structure”; and that the need for strict and unhesitating obedience and 
discipline in the military counseled strongly against allowing the civilian judiciary to intrude on behalf 
of enlisted men against their officers); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681–83 (1987) (stating 
that allowing this Bivens suit would “call into question military discipline and decisionmaking 
[and] . . . require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters” that had not been 
invited by Congress, the branch of government that the Constitution expressly empowered to make 
“Rules” regarding the military). 
 95. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406–08, 417 (2002) (“The particular facts of this 
case underscore the need for care on the part of . . . the [C]ourt in determining[] the claim for relief 
underlying the access-to-courts plea. The action alleged on the part of all the Government defendants 
(the State Department and NSC defendants sued for denial of access and the CIA defendants who 
would have been timely sued on the underlying claim but for the denial) was apparently taken in the 
conduct of foreign relations by the National Government. Thus, if there is to be judicial enquiry, it will 
raise concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches. 
‘[F]oreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive.’ ‘[T]he very nature of executive 
decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.’” (citations omitted)). 
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might well bring actions for damages to remedy claimed violations of the 
Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters.96 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist suggested that a judicial opinion 
holding that the Fourth Amendment applied to the extraterritorial law 
enforcement seizures would “apply not only to law enforcement operations 
abroad, but also to other foreign policy operations” abroad in which, the 
Chief suggested, application of Fourth Amendment strictures could be very 
damaging to U.S. national security interests.
97
 In other words, executive 
officials will feel bound to conform their future conduct in all relevant 
areas according to the rules and doctrines announced in the Supreme 
Court’s (and maybe the courts of appeals’) constitutional opinions, but 
constitutional rules issued for one setting might not be appropriate for all 
areas of government activity. In particular, it seems quite likely that 
constitutional law declared in domestic or non-national security related 
contexts (like “law enforcement operations”98) could be poor fits for 
military and other national security operations overseas. This suggestion is 
interesting because in constitutional tort litigation in ordinary domestic 
cases, the Court frequently suggests that it is highly desirable that the 
reasoning and doctrines of its judicial opinions have widespread 
prospective, conduct-altering effect on government officials in relevantly 
similar contexts.99 
Echoing (or actually prefiguring) many of the Court’s concerns in 
Harbury and Verdugo-Urquidez is a frequently cited decision by then-
Judge Scalia of the D.C. Circuit, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan.100 
 
 96. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262–63, 273–74 (1990) (citing Bivens). 
 97. Id. at 273–74 (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 273. 
 99. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (discussing the value of 
“promot[ing] the development of constitutional precedent” by issuing rulings on the constitutionality of 
official conduct in damages suits); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (same); Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (same). 
Similarly, scholars writing about constitutional litigation in the domestic context frequently assert or 
assume that it is an obvious good for the Supreme Court or lower courts to issue opinions setting out 
doctrine that the other branches of government must follow in all applicable circumstances. See, e.g., 
Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 
1918, 1923, 1922 (2007); James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional 
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602–08 (2011). 
 100. The putative Bivens suit was brought by residents of Nicaragua and other plaintiffs against 
President Reagan, the CIA director, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other senior officials 
challenging U.S. actions in Nicaragua. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205–08 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). Judge Scalia wrote that “[w]e have no doubt that . . . considerations of institutional competence 
preclude judicial creation of damage remedies here. . . . [and] the special needs of foreign affairs must 
stay our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy officials for 
allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad.” Id. at 208–09. Judge 
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III.  PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS: IS THERE ANYTHING WORTH 
TALKING ABOUT?  
Before developing positive accounts of why the courts now prefer 
injunctive-type remedies over damages and how a bar on Bivens suits in 
national security and foreign relations contexts functions as part of system-
wide doctrinal equilibration, this part will consider two types of objections 
to the project of this Article. First, this part will address the arguments of a 
number of commentators that the courts of appeals have simply misapplied 
Supreme Court Bivens doctrine, or that the national security concerns are 
ill-defined or otherwise inappropriate considerations for the courts. If the 
courts of appeals are merely erring rather than, as I see it, acting in a way 
consistent with Supreme Court doctrines and attitudes, this Article’s project 
would be much less interesting. But, I conclude that the critics’ arguments 
miss the mark. To be clear, I am not endorsing the holding of any particular 
case that, on a given set of facts, specific national security concerns should 
bar a Bivens remedy. My point is more general—it was not doctrinal error 
for the lowers courts to weigh concerns of this type in making their Bivens 
decisions. 
A second potential objection to this project is the view that Bivens 
suits against national security officials are so unlikely to succeed for a 
variety of reasons that they represent more of a minor nuisance than an 
important topic of study. In brief, the claim is that various pro-defendant 
litigation doctrines, such as qualified immunity and the practice of the 
federal government of routinely defending and indemnifying its sued 
employees, render Bivens suits irrelevant. I conclude that, while there is an 
element of truth to this, the reality is more complicated. 
A.  DID THE COURTS OF APPEALS SIMPLY MISAPPLY SUPREME COURT 
DOCTRINE? 
A number of academics and commentators have criticized the courts 
of appeals for relying on what they view as vague, overly broad or 
otherwise ill-defined national security considerations to deny a Bivens 
remedy.101 Others suggest that the refusal to allow a Bivens remedy in these 
 
Scalia further noted that there is a possibility of “‘embarrassment of our government abroad’ through 
‘multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,’” id. at 209 (quoting Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226, 217 (1962)), and the possibility that “foreign citizens[] [are] using the courts in 
situations such as this to obstruct the foreign policy of our government.” Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Brief for Distinguished Professors of Constitutional and Federal Courts Law as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6, Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 
09-16478) [hereinafter Distinguished Brief] (criticizing Arar as “wrongly decided” and stating that it 
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cases undermines the rule of law and allows the executive branch to be 
immunized for gross misconduct—the implication being that the national 
security considerations invoked by the courts are either improper or 
insubstantial compared to competing values.102 In addition, some 
commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s Bivens decisions hold 
that the “special factors” inquiry is concerned solely with legislative-
judicial separation of powers on the question of authority to determine a 
remedy.103 As a result, the scholars conclude that it is a misapplication of 
Supreme Court doctrine for the circuit courts to allow other concerns, such 
as executive-judicial or legislative-judicial concerns about national security 
and foreign relations competence and authority to be counted as special 
factors.104  
 
relied only on “ipse dixit” regarding the national security considerations); Vladeck, After Iqbal, supra 
note 12, at 259, 269, 275 (stating that the circuit courts relied on “amorphous,” “poorly defined,” and 
“vague and generalized national security concerns”); Jonathan Hafetz, The Next Supreme Court 
National Security Detention Case?, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 26, 2011), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/08/next-supreme-court-national-security.html (arguing that the 
rationales for a presumption against Bivens in national security cases are troubling because they are 
overly expansive). 
 102. See, e.g., Replacement Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Maher Arar at 4, 
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2010) (en banc) (No. 06-4216-cv) (arguing to the en banc court 
that the panel’s presumption against Bivens in national security cases was based on “loose reasoning” 
that “[a]t best . . . creates a legal ‘no man’s land’ . . . . [and] [a]t worst . . . precludes future damages 
claims that merely touch upon anti-terrorism efforts”); id. at 3 (“[T]he factors cited by the panel 
majority as foreclosing a Bivens action on separation of powers grounds would be insufficient to find 
the case non-justiciable under a traditional political question inquiry.”); Hafetz, supra note 13 (arguing 
that the Fourth Circuit’s Lebron decision barring Bivens in national security cases was “a significant 
setback for the rule of law,” “undermines the principle that government officials should be held 
accountable for their illegal conduct,” and makes courts “instruments of impunity” for torture). 
 103. See. e.g., Bernstein, supra note 13, at 720–21 (stating that the special factors inquiry looks 
only at “whether Congress has indicated that it wishes to reserve decisionmaking about remediation in 
some area for itself”). A number of scholars, including Erwin Chemerinsky, Paul Carrington, David 
Golove, William Van Alstyne, Michael Tigar, Kermit Roosevelt III, and Steve Vladeck, agree. See 
Distinguished Brief, supra note 101, at 23 (stating that “the separation of powers concern[] underlying 
the ‘special factors’ standard” in the Supreme Court’s case law is “deference to the law-making powers 
of the legislature”); Brief of Constitutional Law and Federal Courts Professors as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-6480) 
(stating that the Supreme Court’s case law establishes that special factors analysis “involves separation-
of-powers concerns over interference with the legislative, rather than executive, prerogative” and that 
“[f]ear of undue judicial interference with the executive branch has not been part of the Court’s ‘special 
factors’ analysis in applying Bivens”). 
 104. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 13, at 723 (suggesting that courts barring Bivens in national 
security cases “do not understand the rationale of the special factors analysis” because of Executive-
Judiciary issues); Hafetz, supra note 101 (“The defendants’ arguments about the need to protect 
sensitive information and avoid interference with military decisionmaking rest on a fundamental 
misconception of Bivens: the Supreme Court intended ‘special factors’ to protect legislative, not 
executive, prerogatives.”). 
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1.  What Are “Special Factors”?  
To evaluate these arguments, we must first understand what type of 
inquiry the Court is performing when it decides whether “special factors” 
are present that counsel against extending Bivens to a new claim or context. 
According to the Court, this is a prudential “judgment” by the court acting 
in a “common law” capacity to decide whether it is appropriate and 
desirable to allow a specific type of judicial remedy even though Congress 
has not authorized it.105 As Justice Souter wrote, joined by Justices Breyer 
and Ginsburg, a Bivens remedy is “a novel rule that a proponent has a 
burden to justify affirmatively on policy grounds in every context in which 
it might arguably be recognized.”106 This inquiry is heavily focused on the 
propriety of judicial caution before authorizing a remedy Congress has not 
chosen.107 
But, contrary to the suggestion of some scholars,
108
 the Court’s Bivens 
doctrine makes considerations other than Congress’s choice of particular 
remedies relevant. In Stanley, for example, the Court noted that the “special 
factors” analysis in that case was “essentially a policy judgment” about 
“how harmful and inappropriate judicial intrusion upon” executive 
functioning—in that case “military discipline” and the military chain of 
command—“is thought to be.”109 Though they do not contain holdings 
about Bivens, three cases give a flavor of the Court’s approach. In Harbury 
and Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court was concerned about judicial interference 
with the executive’s extraterritorial actions in foreign affairs and national 
security, as was then-Judge Scalia in Sanchez-Espinoza.110 In addition, 
Iqbal is suffused with concerns about judicial interference with high-level 
 
 105. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2010) (“[A] Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment: 
‘the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law 
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before 
authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’” (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007))); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (describing the question presented in Bivens as “whether compensatory relief is 
‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindication of the interest asserted,” and stating that the Court would 
evaluate a “range of policy considerations” in the same fashion as a legislature); Arar, 585 F.3d at 621 
(analyzing the Court’s special factors case law and deciding it “must be regarded as a prudential 
limitation”). 
 106. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 117 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by 
Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J.). 
 107. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (declining to extend Bivens remedy into 
new context and showing deference to Congress); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) 
(same); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1983) (same). 
 108. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
 109. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987). 
 110. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text. 
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national security officials.111 Moreover, in Butz v. Economou, a case about 
alleged misconduct by a federal administrative agency and its officials 
against a regulated entity, the Court said that, when Congress has not 
legislated about remedies in a particular context, deciding whether to 
extend Bivens into that context involves a judicial assessment of “whether 
the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the 
plaintiff’s claim.”112 Wilkie made clear that general concerns about 
administrability and inviting too many legal claims against the executive 
branch enter into the special factors analysis.113 Thus, the Court’s case law 
refutes the scholars’ claim that special factors pertain only to Congress’s 
views about choices between different remedies. 
In non-Bivens contexts, when the Supreme Court reasons about what 
kinds of remedies are appropriate, it takes account of a wide range of 
interests, such as the interests of the federal executive branch and the 
public’s interest in safety and security. Take, for example, the exclusionary 
rule, the primary way that the Fourth Amendment is enforced. As with 
Bivens, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, and the Court 
views the question whether and when to apply it as a policy-laden 
“prudential” decision.114 A wide range of governmental and societal 
interests are factored into the Court’s determination of when to apply this 
remedy.115 The Court also considers administrability concerns and 
incentives of litigants.116 Similarly, in exercising its equitable discretion to 
decide whether to approve an injunction, the Court evaluates a wide range 
of factors. In a recent case, where it was asked to approve an injunction 
issued in aid of habeas jurisdiction over a security detainee held in Iraq by 
U.S. military forces during the insurgency period, the Court counseled 
caution about intruding into military matters on a foreign battlefield and 
 
 111. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 112. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 480, 503 (1978). 
 113. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561 (2007) (noting that allowing a Bivens claim of the 
type pressed by the plaintiff “would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action 
affecting property interests”). Cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (citing as a special factor 
the “potentially enormous financial burden” that agency liability under Bivens would create). 
 114. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998). 
 115. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (invoking concerns about 
“set[ting] the criminal loose in the community without punishment”); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
1032, 1050 (1984) (holding the exclusionary rule unavailable because “[t]he costs of applying the 
exclusionary rule in the context of civil deportation hearings are high”). 
 116. For example, the Court cited the fact that imposing exclusion as the remedy “for a knock-
and-announce violation would generate a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule,” leading 
to “extensive” and fact-intensive litigation, as a reason not to allow the remedy. Hudson v. Michigan, 
547 U.S. 586, 594–95 (2006). 
DO NOT DELETE 9/1/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] BIVENS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 1151 
denied relief.117 Since these kinds of interests can be part of the Court’s 
prudential policy balancing when it decides whether to allow other 
discretionary remedies—injunctions and the exclusionary rule, which is 
quasi-injunctive in its effects—it seems reasonable that they would be 
available for the same kind of remedial balancing of equities that the 
Court’s case law requires in the Bivens context. 
Carlos Vázquez and Steve Vladeck have recently argued that, under 
their view of the Court’s doctrine, the special factors that would counsel 
against extending Bivens “must be factors that favor leaving the question of 
damages to other existing remedial regimes, including state law. Factors 
that would favor leaving the plaintiff with no cause of action at all would 
bear instead on the question of defenses, such as official immunity.”118 The 
separation of powers and national security-related reasons justifying the 
courts of appeals’ refusals to extend Bivens were inapposite under the 
Supreme Court’s case law, Vázquez and Vladeck conclude, because they 
were reasons to preclude any judicial remedy under doctrines of 
“immunity, privilege, or preemption,” not reasons to prefer an alternate 
remedial regime such as state tort law over Bivens.
119
 
I read the Supreme Court’s Bivens case law differently. In my view, 
the Court in both Chappell and Stanley assumed that the plaintiffs had no 
viable cause of action under state or federal law, and no effective remedy 
from any alternate federal system.120 Thus, the Court’s Bivens doctrine has 
long tolerated denying Bivens even when there is no other effective 
remedy, and as a result, “special factors” cannot only consist of reasons to 
prefer one remedy over another. In addition, as shown above, the Court has 
expressly taken many other interests into account as “special factors.”121  
To make their policy-laden judgment about the propriety of a 
judicially created damages remedy for federal official misconduct in a 
particular context, the courts of appeals hearing the post-9/11 national 
security cases relied on a number of considerations, detailed in Part I, 
 
 117. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679–80, 700 (2008). 
 118. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 12, at 543. 
 119. Id. at 523. 
 120. See infra notes 241–244 and accompanying text for discussion of alternate federal remedial 
avenues in Chappell and Stanley. In Chappell, the Court did not indicate that a state law provided a 
viable remedy. In Stanley, the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, and Justice Brennan’s 
dissent all assumed that Stanley lacked a state law remedy. E.g., Stanley, 483 U.S. at 706–07 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (discussing possible alternate remedies for the respondent and not mentioning state tort 
suits). Thus in both cases, in the absence of Bivens, the plaintiffs had “no cause of action at all,” and 
their federal remedies were either nonexistent or very far from being “appealing.” 
 121. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
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sounding in separation of powers, comparative institutional competence, 
and special deference in military, diplomatic, and intelligence contexts.
122
 
The courts of appeals did not pull these out of thin air. A number of these 
concerns were referenced by the Supreme Court in discussing Bivens in 
Harbury, Verdugo-Urquidez, Iqbal, Chappell, and Stanley.123 And every 
single one of these concerns cited by the circuit courts had previously been 
used by the Supreme Court to help it resolve a wide variety of issues 
involving substantive law, procedural contexts, types of legal questions, 
and requested remedies very different from the Bivens question raised in 
the post-9/11 cases.124  
Because the Supreme Court has found these considerations important 
in so many other areas, it is somewhat difficult to maintain that they are all 
too ill-defined or otherwise inappropriate to apply to the prudential policy 
decision of whether to extend Bivens, or that a courts of appeals that 
 
 122. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 124. The comparative institutional competence and authority of the President and Congress 
compared to the judiciary in foreign affairs and national security has been invoked in dozens of 
Supreme Court decisions across a wide variety of topics, in which the Court has expressed caution 
about fettering the political branches’ actions in the national security and foreign relations areas. See, 
e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010); Jama v. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). 
The reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with the executive’s ability to speak with “single voice[]” 
about foreign relations matters is part of the political question doctrine, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
211 (1962), and frequently mentioned in other procedural contexts, E.g., Munaf v. Geren 553 U.S. 674, 
702–03 (2008); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431–33 (1964). Caution about 
allowing judicial review to disclose national security secrets held by the executive, or more general 
considerations about the executive’s superior ability to obtain and keep secrets, have been mentioned by 
the Court in numerous contexts. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1910 
(2011) (state-secrets privilege); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (executive privilege). 
Concern about executive officials being “overdeterred” from taking vigorous and effective action in the 
public interest because of fear of personal liability is the keystone of the Court’s official immunity 
doctrine and, as discussed above, is thought to be particularly problematic for senior policymakers 
responding to national security crises. See infra notes 217–221 and accompanying text. The Court has 
expressed concerns about extending judicial review into active war zones overseas, e.g., Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770, 793 (2008); Munaf, 553 U.S. at 700; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 
784 (1950), and about allowing the judiciary to be used by noncitizens located abroad to challenge the 
U.S. government and undermine its prestige and legitimacy, see e.g., United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1990) (quoted in text accompanying supra note 96); Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. at 789. 
The Court has suggested that certain structural constitutional doctrines restricting congressional or 
executive power are relaxed or even absent in the foreign affairs and national security areas. See, e.g., 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (principle of enumeration as limitation does not 
apply to Congress’s power over immigration); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) 
(allowing statutes “closely related” but not on point to count as congressional delegations of foreign 
relations power). Even individual constitutional rights can be diminished or even eliminated in some 
contexts due to concerns about security. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
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declines to extend Bivens in national security cases misapplied Supreme 
Court doctrine in considering them.  
Again, I emphasize that I am not endorsing the way these factors were 
applied in any given Bivens case, but I am making the much more modest 
claim that, despite an avalanche of criticism, the courts of appeals did not 
misunderstand or misapply Supreme Court doctrine. 
B.  DO BIVENS SUITS MATTER? 
When discussing early versions of this project, some of the reactions I 
heard were polarized around the relevance of Bivens. One view was that 
Bivens suits are so well known to be bark rather than bite that there is not 
much to talk about. First, these readers pointed out, the rules and practices 
of litigation in this area greatly favor government defendants; qualified 
immunity, heightened pleading under Iqbal, interlocutory appeals, the 
courts’ presumption against extending Bivens, the political question 
doctrine, the state secrets privilege, and underlying judicial reticence in the 
national security area are some of the obvious ones. Second, it was said, the 
result of these factors is that Bivens suits almost never succeed.125 Third, 
even while they are ongoing, Bivens suits matter little to officials because 
the Department of Justice defends them, and the U.S. government will 
indemnify them.126  
Another very different reaction I heard, including from people who 
had served in the executive branch, conceded the general thrust of the 
above points, but still asserted that officials are in fact concerned about the 
prospect or actuality of Bivens suits against them, and that this might well 
shape the incentives or behavior of those officials. 
Although it is impossible to conclusively document the inner thoughts 
of the many human beings who make up the executive branch, in my view, 
the second reaction is more accurate. Bivens suits undoubtedly face many 
obstacles to success, but Alexander Reinert has shown that far more 
succeed than previously assumed—in fact, they appear to be about as 
successful as other types of challenges to alleged government 
misconduct.127 Jack Goldsmith recently conducted wide-ranging interviews 
 
 125. See Reinert, supra note 66, at 826–28 (documenting the widespread view that almost no 
Bivens suits succeed). 
 126. It is widely asserted or assumed by scholars that, when sued under Bivens, nearly all officials 
are defended and indemnified by their government employers so that they do not incur an actual risk of 
monetary liability. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE 
CONSTITUTION 68–69 (2d ed. 2007). 
 127. Reinert, supra note 66, at 813. 
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with national security officials, and heard that the prospect of personal 
damages liability is concerning.128 While almost all federal employees will 
get government-paid defense counsel when sued for official conduct,129 it 
is not guaranteed by law that employees will be indemnified for judgments 
or settlements against them—and even if they are indemnified, they likely 
will not know that until after judgment.130 It seems likely that word of this 
travels through the grapevine of the executive branch. In addition, many 
federal officials obtain personal liability insurance policies.131 Unless they 
are dramatically misinformed or excessively risk averse, this suggests that 
Bivens suits are reasonably thought to be a danger to their pocketbooks.  
It seems likely that the highest officials—the Attorney General or CIA 
director, for example—are somewhat differently situated than lower level 
officials. The highest officials can be sued hundreds of times and it seems 
exceedingly unlikely that the government would not defend and indemnify 
them. But there are good reasons to believe that Bivens matters a good deal 
to all save those at the very top. 
 
 128. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, 
at 234–35, 238–39 (2012). 
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012) authorizes Department of Justice attorneys to defend claims against 
federal employees in accordance with guidelines found at 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.15, .16 (2013) 
 130. Many, but probably not all, federal employees who might be sued under Bivens arising out of 
national security activities may be indemnified for any damages assessed against them, but have no 
legal right to require indemnification. Regulations or publicly available directives covering all 
employees of the Department of Justice (which includes the FBI), the State Department, the Department 
of Homeland Security, and the Treasury Department provide that each agency “may,” at the discretion 
of the agency head or a designee, indemnify for any judgment or pay any negotiated settlement if the 
defendant employee’s conduct was within the scope of his or her employment and the indemnification 
or payment is in the interest of the agency. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)(1), (2) (2013) (Department of Justice); 
31 C.F.R. § 3.30(a), (b) (2013) (Department of Treasury); 22 C.F.R. § 21.1(a), (b) (2013) (Department 
of State); Management Directive Regarding Indemnification of Employees Acting in Official Capacity, 
MD # 0415 (Sept. 26, 2005), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_ 
0415_indemnification_employees_acting_official_capacity.pdf Generally, similar rules seem to apply 
to certain Department of Defense employees. E.g., 32 C.F.R. § 516.32(a) (2013) (Department of the 
Army). The Central Intelligence Agency’s regulations and directives are classified, but it appears that 
there is legal authority for indemnifying them from personal capacity tort judgments. See Dep’t of 
Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice Releases Four Office of Legal Counsel 
Opinions, JUSTICE.GOV (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-ag-356.html.  
In practice, federal officials have a tiny chance of ultimately paying a judgment out of pocket. Reinert, 
supra note 66, at 846 (examining large dataset from several judicial districts and finding that “there is 
no indication that successful Bivens claims result in individual officers paying out personal funds to 
satisfy judgments or settlements”). 
 131. Paul Michael Brown, Personal Liability Tort Litigation Against Federal Employees: A 
Primer, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 329, 331 (2011). Certain employees are entitled to partial rebates of these 
premium payments, id., which might suggest that Congress views the insurance as important to official 
job functions. 
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IV.  THE TRIUMPH OF LAW DECLARATION OVER INDIVIDUAL 
REMEDIATION  
This part begins the work of explaining why the modern Court is so 
hostile to Bivens at a time when it has never been more active in 
authorizing intrusive injunctive-type remedies in constitutional litigation 
and in ruling against the executive in national security and foreign affairs 
disputes concerning judicial power and authority. 
The starting point is an analysis of the goals, the role in the legal 
system, and the preferred mode of operation of the Supreme Court. The 
modern Court has come to view its role in securing government compliance 
with the law to be primarily about declaring law that will prospectively 
bind government actors system-wide, rather than providing individual 
redress. It then shows how the Court appears to use its law declaring 
powers to provide what it sees as adequate checks and balances on the 
executive branch in the national security area, largely obviating any need 
for a remedy for each affected individual. 
This does not fully answer the question of why the Court seems to 
prefer to do most of its law declaration work in the national security area 
via injunctive-type suits rather than damages actions. That is the burden of 
Parts V and VI. 
A.  UBI JUS IBI REMEDIUM? 
Numerous individuals, some of whom seem indisputably to have been 
grievously wronged by post-9/11 national security actions, have been 
denied any compensation or redress because of the lack of Bivens or other 
compensatory remedies.132 Contrary to the ancient maxim ubi jus ibi 
remedium (for every right there must be a remedy), individuals in these 
cases have been left without a remedy even when the violation of core 
rights protecting life, limb, and property seems clear. The notion that a 
rights violation requires a civil remedy lies at the foundation of the 
common law of torts,133 was reiterated by Blackstone,134 assumed by the 
authors of The Federalist,135 and proclaimed by the Supreme Court in 
 
 132. For example, there is essentially no dispute that Mr. Arar, see supra note 11, was wholly 
innocent. 
 133. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 16 (1998). 
 134. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23 (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that 
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is 
invaded.”). 
 135. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15, 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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many decisions, including Marbury v. Madison and Bivens itself.136 It is 
widely considered a foundational principle of our constitutional order 
premised on limited government and the rule of law that wrongs by 
government officials can be redressed through the legal system. 
The circuit court decisions denying a Bivens remedy because of 
national security and foreign affairs considerations reflect an implicit view 
that ubi jus ibi remedium is not a firm constitutional command, but at best 
an aspiration which can be honored in the breach. Academic commentary 
tends to strongly favor the contrary view—that the Constitution mandates 
individual effective remedies.137 Critics of the appellate level Bivens 
decisions have suggested that they may violate the Constitution by failing 
to provide an adequate remedy for unconstitutional conduct of federal 
officials.138 
What type and amount of remedies the Constitution requires for 
violations of constitutional rights is an extraordinarily complex and 
controversial subject. Although there are many broad statements in Court 
decisions about when rights require individualized remedies,139 and there 
are some Court holdings that interpret the Constitution as requiring a 
specific remedy in a specific circumstance,140 the Supreme Court does not 
have any clear doctrine about how the issue should be understood and 
 
 136. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147, 163 (1803); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). See also United States v. 
Loughrey, 172 U.S. 206, 232 (1898) (“The maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium lies at the very foundation of 
all systems of law, and . . . I cannot believe that the common law departs from it.”); Florida v. Georgia, 
58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 493 (1854) (“[I]f this case is decided adversely to their rights, they are without 
remedy, and there is no form of proceeding in which they could have that decision revised in this court 
or anywhere else. Justice, therefore, requires that they should be heard before their rights are 
concluded.”); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838) (“[A] monstrous absurdity in 
a well organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right 
should be shown to exist.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1553–54 (1972); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages 
Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (1989). See also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional 
Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 262 n.16 (2000) (stating that “the weight of academic opinion . . . favors 
strict liability for all constitutional violations” and citing examples). 
 138. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 138 (2009); Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 12, at 573–
75. 
 139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 140. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793–95 (2008) (holding that, unless Congress 
acts to suspend habeas corpus during a rebellion or invasion, the Constitution requires that habeas or a 
meaningful substitute be available in certain circumstances); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315–16 (1987) (holding that the Takings Clause requires the 
government to compensate a taking). 
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resolved generally. The view that individual remedies are always required 
is profoundly at odds with centuries of Supreme Court doctrine, under 
which government wrongs have gone effectively unremedied because of 
doctrines of sovereign immunity, official immunity, standing, ripeness, 
mootness, the political question doctrine, exhaustion of remedies, 
abstention, congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, and the 
like.141 Moreover, as Anthony Bellia has shown, even in English common 
law, the supposed source of the rule, ubi jus ibi remedium was generally a 
mere “platitude.”142 
Departing from the views of the many academics who support 
remediation of every constitutional wrong, Richard Fallon and Daniel 
Meltzer suggest that individual remediation is not always required, but that 
the Constitution does require “a system of constitutional remedies adequate 
to keep government generally within the bounds of law.”143 This view 
better accounts for all the doctrines which limit full remediation and strikes 
me as an accurate descriptive account of how the Supreme Court sees 
constitutional remedies and the judiciary’s role providing them, including 
in the national security area. As Fallon and Meltzer suggest, the Court 
appears to evaluate the utility of different potential remedies not 
individually—not by asking whether an allegedly wronged individual will 
need it for effective individual redress—but as part of a larger package of 
doctrines and remedies that can be used to satisfy its systemic goal of 
maintaining the rule of law while accommodating other interests.
144
 
B.  JUDICIAL LAW DECLARATION AS A SYSTEM-WIDE REMEDY 
Fallon and Meltzer’s articulation of the Court’s views about remedies 
tracks another important distinction drawn by scholars of the Court, 
especially in constitutional litigation. It is often said that there are two 
models of the function of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts: the 
case or dispute resolution model, in which a court’s function is to protect 
private rights and provide individual redress, and the law declaration 
 
 141. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1781–86 (1991) (describing cases involving some 
of these doctrines as ones “in which no effective redress could be obtained for rights violations 
committed by the government and its officers,” and noting that “the number of such cases has expanded 
under doctrines that are now well entrenched”). 
 142. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 784, 786 
(2004). 
 143. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 141, at 1778–79. 
 144. Id. 
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model, in which the court’s function is to say what the law is.145 Both 
models trace their lineage to Marbury v. Madison, which in defending 
judicial review, famously declared that the court’s “duty” is to “say what 
the law is,” while emphasizing that this power is properly exercised only in 
service of the court’s “duty” to provide a remedy for violations of an 
individual’s private right.146  
But contrary to Marbury, in recent decades, the law declaration role 
has been largely decoupled from individual dispute resolution and redress. 
The Court no longer, if it ever did, believes that individually effective 
remedies are constitutionally required in every case of government 
misconduct. Instead, the Court seeks to ensure its systemic goal of 
maintaining the rule of law within the other branches.  
The Court does not accomplish systemic rule of law primarily by 
providing individual redress and dispute resolution, but rather through law 
declaration. In fact, the most important “remedy” the Court deploys is its 
ability to declare law and be confident it will be obeyed prospectively by 
government actors system-wide in all relevant contexts. To be clear, the 
Court often declares law in this fashion in cases seeking money damages 
for individual redress,147 so I am not arguing that that law declaration only 
occurs in injunctive-type cases or that it has entirely displaced litigation 
seeking individual redress. 
Certain structural features of constitutional law, combined with the 
role the Court has claimed for itself in our legal system, help explain how 
law declaration might be thought of as a remedy and as a rough, 
prospective substitute for retrospective redress and individual dispute 
resolution. Governments at all levels—and for purposes of this Article, 
what really matters is the federal government—have essentially acceded to 
the Supreme Court’s demand in Cooper v. Aaron that the constitutional 
doctrines and rules announced by the Court in its decisions be treated as 
equivalent to the Constitution itself, and therefore, as prospectively binding 
rules of law applicable to all government actors facing circumstances 
within the scope of those rules or doctrines.148 This broad acceptance149 by 
 
 145. FALLON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 72–80; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: 
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–71 (1973). 
 146. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 177 (1803); Monaghan, supra note 28, at 
667–73. 
 147. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030–33 (2011) (discussing law declaration 
via § 1983 constitutional tort suits). 
 148. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958). See also FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 70 
(stating that the view of judicial supremacy announced in Cooper v. Aaron is now “conventional 
wisdom”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common 
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other branches of government of the Court’s vision of supremacy is seen 
even in the national security area, where we might expect the executive to 
be more likely to insist on its own independent right to interpret the 
Constitution and laws unless binding judicial judgments in particular 
litigated cases required otherwise.150 There is no other explanation for the 
executive’s recent decisions to moot just before Supreme Court review 
several individual lawsuits raising significant war-on-terror legal 
issues151—the Administration feared not a judgment against it in an 
individual case, but a Court opinion declaring law that the executive would 
feel bound to apply across the board going forward. Although the Court 
still maintains, as a rhetorical matter, that it exists merely to resolve 
disputes, and that it avoids unnecessary constitutional rulings, it is widely 
understood that the Court seeks out opportunities to rule on constitutional 
issues (or other legal issues) precisely in order to announce doctrine that 
will function as prospectively binding law system-wide.152 
The Court’s widely accepted authority to announce rules and doctrines 
of law that will prospectively bind government officials across the board 
can be usefully thought of as a type of remedy—analogous in its effect to a 
 
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1975) (“[T]he Court’s great prestige has fostered the impression that every 
detailed rule laid down has the same dignity as the constitutional text itself.”); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, 
The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 728–39 (2005) 
(showing that the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel and Solicitor General’s Office 
generally treat Supreme Court and sometimes even court of appeals judicial doctrines as prospectively 
binding constitutional law); James F. Spriggs, II, Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with 
Supreme Court Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567, 584 (1997) (concluding that the studied federal agencies 
complied substantially with Supreme Court opinions). 
For critiques of the view that government officials are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s 
announced doctrines and rules as law, see generally Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a 
Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding 
Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993). 
 149. Of course, compliance by federal officials with the Court’s doctrines is nowhere near 
complete. It is not necessary to my argument to answer the difficult question whether executive branch 
officials truly believe that the Court’s doctrines, rules, and tests constitute supreme binding law in all 
relevant circumstances covered by them, or rather whether executive officials treat the Court’s law 
declarations as predictions of how courts will rule in future lawsuits and therefore, worth following for 
efficiency, legitimacy, or related reasons. 
 150. See Neal Devins, Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy Combatants: How Lawmakers 
Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1562, 
1566, 1574–75, 1579 (2007) (showing that during the Bush administration, both the President and 
Congress treated the Court’s holdings and doctrines in the post-9/11 cases as authoritative and binding). 
 151. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (mem.); al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 
(2009) (mem.); Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (mem.). 
 152. Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 854 
(2005); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093–94, 1100–05 
(1987). 
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legal system-wide declaratory judgment or perhaps even structural 
injunction.153 The power and reach of this system-wide coercive effect 
depends not only on widespread acceptance of a certain strong kind of 
judicial supremacy in our law and politics, but also on important structural 
features of our system of constitutional law. As a result of the way 
“incorporation” and “reverse-incorporation” of constitutional rights have 
occurred, the same individual constitutional rights apply in essentially the 
same ways to government officials at the local, state, and national levels.154 
In certain areas, including criminal procedure, which is highly important in 
national security, the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution have 
created such a dense thicket of rules and doctrines that observers equate it 
to a comprehensive legal code of conduct.155 The Court’s interpretations of 
the Constitution therefore have pervasive effects on government conduct of 
its daily affairs. And constitutional criminal procedure tends to be 
transsubstantive, meaning that distinctions are not made based on the 
nature or seriousness of the offense.156 
Thus, a Supreme Court decision arising out of the investigation of a 
routine minor crime by local police can announce, for example, Fourth 
Amendment rules that will prospectively bind government officials all the 
way up to the most senior national policymakers when they are directing 
responses to the most serious national security threats. The fact that the 
Court is, and knows that it is, declaring law that will bind all levels of 
government across many different contexts, often in very precise and 
detailed ways, can have profound effects on how the Court crafts its 
constitutional doctrines. 
The Court has exercised this system-wide law declaring power to 
great effect in the national security area post-9/11, not only in 
constitutional cases, but also when it is declaring the meaning of widely 
applicable or otherwise significant subconstitutional law. In a four-year 
 
 153. This point has been made by a number of scholars. E.g., Karlan, supra note 99, at 1923. For a 
recent example in the national security area, see Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security 
Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 240. 
 154. See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1515–16 (2005). 
 155. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3 (1996) (“In criminal procedure, just about everything is constitutionalized; non-
constitutional law is usually unimportant, and constitutional law has the look of a code designed for 
comprehensive coverage.”). 
 156. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002) 
(“[M]ost constitutional limits on policing are transsubstantive—they apply equally to suspected drug 
dealers and suspected terrorists.”). There are some exceptions to this broad rule. See infra note 274 and 
accompanying text.  
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span, the Supreme Court issued rulings in four habeas cases157 that, through 
the law they declared and the steps the executive and Congress took to 
comply with it, had the effect, as Aziz Huq describes, of “transforming the 
institutional structure” of several entire national security programs, 
including ones which were not parties to the litigation, in ways that were so 
“dramatic and wide-ranging” that the rulings had effects “somewhat akin to 
that achieved by . . . structural injunction[s].”158 
For instance, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, nominally a habeas case brought 
by a single individual to challenge his military commission trial,
159
 the 
Court’s opinion and the rules of law it declared ended up fundamentally 
transforming not only the rules for military commissions, but also U.S. 
military and CIA detention and interrogation methods worldwide.
160
 This 
latter effect occurred when the Court, after rejecting a plausible contrary 
interpretation relied on by the executive,
161
 held that Common Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions (which banned “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” and other 
abuses)
162
, applied to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban.163 
“Coercive interrogation” was now clearly illegal, as the Court almost 
certainly knew and intended it would be. This law declaration spurred an 
enormously significant series of changes by various national security 
agencies to suspend questionable practices.164 The military commission 
system was also reshaped significantly as a result of the Court’s law 
declaration in Hamdan, and here again, the Court rejected a plausible 
executive branch interpretation of the law.165 
Another case, Boumediene v. Bush, a decision on the consolidated 
habeas cases of a small number of detainees,166 held that the Constitution 
required that noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay have access to 
habeas corpus or a substantially similar procedure to challenge their 
detention as enemy combatants by the U.S. military.
167
 While technically 
 
 157. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 158. Huq, supra note 153, at 240. 
 159. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566–67. 
 160. Huq, supra note 153, at 241. 
 161. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630. 
 162. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 163. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632. 
 164. E.g., Huq, supra note 153, at 241–42. 
 165. Id. at 241. 
 166. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733–35 (2008). 
 167. Id. at 732–33. 
DO NOT DELETE 9/1/2014  5:18 PM 
1162 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87: 1123 
only limited to a few petitioners, a single unique location (Guantanamo 
Bay) and to a single procedural clause of the Constitution (the Suspension 
Clause), the ruling was a revolutionary break from past practice and the 
Court’s own precedents holding that noncitizens outside the United States 
lack individual constitutional rights.168 The Court’s declaration of the law 
actually had the—in my view, intended169—effect of signaling to the 
executive that judicial review applying the Constitution more broadly—
including perhaps some of the “code” of criminal procedure rules—might 
occur in any extraterritorial location where the U.S. government exercised 
pervasive coercive power, including in war zones.170  
In the oral arguments and decisions concerning these post-9/11 
national security cases, the Court and individual justices frequently asserted 
that the Court’s interventions were required to maintain sufficient judicial 
power and checks on the political branches in order to ensure that the rule 
of law prevailed.171 The Court also frequently expressed its related view 
that the rule of law requires the rule of judges.172 In other words, the 
 
 168. Cole, supra note 38, at 47–49. For documentation of the claim that pre-Boumediene doctrine 
and practice rejected constitutional rights for noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of the United 
States, see Kent, Insular Cases, supra note 38, at 123–32; Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws 
of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1853–60 (2010) [hereinafter Kent, Civil 
War]; J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 
passim (2007) [hereinafter Kent, Global Constitution]. 
 169. Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 38, at 248 (“It was . . . almost certainly an intended effect 
of Boumediene, that the U.S. military in both the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of war took dramatic 
steps to change their arrest and detention procedures to account for the possibility of judicial review.”). 
 170. See id. at 246–48 (“There are several reasons to think Boumediene . . . points toward a new 
era of a globally protective Constitution for noncitizens, even including military enemies.”). The D.C. 
Circuit later held that Boumediene did not extend habeas review to noncitizen military detainees in 
Afghanistan. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 171. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797–98 (“Security subsists . . . in fidelity to freedom’s 
first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal 
liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the 
judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives. Our opinion does not undermine 
the Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is 
vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 
638 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (implying that the Constitution’s separation of powers 
would be undermined if the military could detain and try individuals “without independent review,” in 
other words, without Article III judicial review); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) 
(plurality opinion) (“[U]nless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the 
Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as 
an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of detentions.”). 
 172. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764–65 (suggesting that the lack of judicially enforced 
constitutional rights at Guantanamo Bay would allow “the political branches to govern without legal 
constraint”); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 587 (refusing to abstain from deciding the case because “the various 
individuals assigned review power” over the military commissions—a panel of military officers, then 
the Secretary of Defense, then the President of the United States—“clearly lack the structural insulation 
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Justices seem to be self-aware about the systemic law declaring function I 
am describing.  
V.  THE DECLINE OF COMMON LAW TORT LITIGATION AND 
RISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
This part takes a historical view of the courts’ views of damages 
versus coercive remedies, looking at changes over time that might help 
explain the current contours of litigation against the federal government. 
Law declaration and injunctive-type remedies issued by judges are the 
primary features of this type of litigation today, having replaced jury 
verdicts and money damages as the primary way that federal officials are 
kept within the bounds of the law. This inversion helps explain why in the 
national security and foreign affairs areas today, the courts are so hostile to 
Bivens litigation, but forcefully use law declaration, habeas, and injunctive 
remedies to police the executive branch. In other words, this division of 
labor in national security and foreign affairs cases is in keeping with the 
Court’s preferences across the board. The following part, Part VI, will look 
at unique features of national security and foreign relations litigation that 
might make courts especially hostile to suits seeking damages. Let me 
emphasize that this part does not purport to be offering causal claims that 
would satisfy a historian. It discusses trends and changes over time and 
suggests that the nature and result of these changes helps contextualize the 
judiciary’s current approach to remedies. 
A.  BIVENS IS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT THAN COMMON LAW TORT SUITS 
For anyone familiar with American legal history, it is somewhat 
jarring to hear that U.S. courts should not allow tort suits for money 
damages against federal officers involved in national security or foreign 
relations matters, even when U.S. citizens are the plaintiffs. Historically, 
these tort suits have been an important way that U.S. citizens protected 
themselves from federal government excesses during wars and other 
crises.173 For instance, during the Civil War, thousands of tort suits were 
 
from military influence” possessed by a court staffed with “civilian judges”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466, 474 (2004) (explaining that because “[e]xecutive imprisonment” without judicial review is 
“oppressive and lawless,” “this Court has recognized the federal courts’ power to review applications 
for habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involving executive detention, in wartime as well as in times 
of peace” (citation omitted)). 
 173. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 128–32, 137 (1851) (upholding a jury 
verdict against a U.S. army officer for trespass against American property located in Mexico during the 
Mexican War); Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380, 380–83 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605) (charging 
jury in a tort suit by Lambdin Milligan against a U.S. general who arrested him and officers who 
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filed against Union soldiers and civilian executive officials.174 And indeed, 
a number of critics of the judiciary’s limitations on Bivens in the national 
security area today have pointed to this history of damages liability against 
federal officials in national security contexts as a reason that Bivens should 
be presumptively available for national security-related claims.175 
But the modern Bivens suits in national security and foreign relations 
cases are substantially different than the type of common law damages 
actions that historically were allowed. First, for much of American history 
there were significant limits on who could access U.S. courts and claim 
protections of domestic U.S. law, including the Constitution. To generalize 
a great deal, noncitizens outside the United States were not thought to have 
individual rights under the Constitution, nor were enemy fighters, no matter 
where located. And noncitizens who were civilian enemy aliens (nationals 
of a country at war with the United States) or enemy fighters did not have 
the right to access U.S. courts during wartime.176 
The history of tort liability for U.S. officials arising out of national 
security and war contexts thus shows that (1) successful plaintiffs were 
almost exclusively U.S. citizens and noncitizen civilians who were not 
alien enemies, and (2) almost all of these tort suits against U.S. officials 
can be thought of as “home front” issues. There are numerous examples of 
home front cases. We see U.S.-based civilians (either citizens or 
noncitizens who peacefully resided here) alleging that they were exempt 
from militia or army service but nevertheless had been inducted against 
their will or tried and imprisoned or fined for nonperformance of duty by a 
military court.177 We see U.S.-based civilians suing because their property 
 
convicted him in a military commission trial held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)); Crosby v. Cadwalader, 6 F. Cas. 876, 876–77 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1870) (No. 3,419) (charging jury in a tort suit against a U.S. general who detained plaintiff’s vessel); 
McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1236–38, 1247 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 8,673) (holding, in a 
bench trial, a U.S. general liable and awarding damages for false imprisonment of a citizen of California 
who was arrested by the military for exulting at the death of President Lincoln); Walker v. Crane, 29 F. 
Cas. 13, 20–21 (C.C.D. Vt. 1865) (No. 17,067) (charging jury in a trespass suit against a U.S. army 
provost marshal for assault and battery and false imprisonment by a citizen of Vermont); Avery v. 
Bulkly, 1 Root 275, 275–76, 1791 WL 242, at **1 (Conn. 1791) (upholding jury verdict against militia 
commander for assault on civilian during militia exercises); Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257, 265–68 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (finding that military officials were trespassers because plaintiff was not legally 
triable by court-martial during the War of 1812). 
 174. James G. Randall, The Indemnity Act of 1863: A Study in the War-Time Immunity of 
Governmental Officers, 20 MICH. L. REV. 589, 596–97 (1922). 
 175. See Margulies, supra note 15, at 202–03. 
 176. For a fuller discussion, see infra Part VI.E. 
 177. E.g., Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 22 (1827); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
331, 334–35, 337 (1806); Tyler v. Pomeroy, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 480, 482–83 (1864). 
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was seized by soldiers who needed provisions or believed it belonged to or 
was destined to be sold to the enemy.178 We see some U.S.-based civilians 
who were tried by military tribunals for alleged spying or other wartime 
misconduct and used tort suits to contest the military’s jurisdiction over 
them.179 We see some U.S. soldiers trying to use tort suits to challenge 
certain aspects of military discipline or court martial jurisdiction over 
them.180 And the like. 
But apart from the home front and rear echelon issues—and especially 
once the legal issues got fully enmeshed with war—we see very different 
things in the case law. It was a rule generally followed that “[l]east of all, 
will the common law undertake to rejudge acts done flagrante bello in the 
face of the enemy.”181 Complying with the laws of war—which historically 
were very permissive—was a complete defense to a tort suit.182 Enemy 
fighters could not sue U.S. officials in tort.183 And recall that all enemy 
aliens, including civilians, were prohibited from accessing U.S. courts for 
the duration of the conflict.184 By contrast, modern damages suits have 
often been brought by persons designated by the executive as enemy 




Besides the limitations on the types of plaintiffs and types of 
allowable claims in these eighteenth and nineteenth century damages 
 
 178. E.g., McKrell v. Metcalfe, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 533, 534, 1866 WL 3483, at **1 (1866); 
Wellman v. Wickerman, 44 Mo. 484, 484–85, 1869 WL 5082, at **1 (1869). 
 179. E.g., Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380, 380 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605); Smith v. Shaw, 
12 Johns. 257, 257–59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); M’Connell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1815). 
 180. E.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 78 (1857); Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 89, 89 (1849). 
 181. Tyler, 90 Mass. at 484–85 (opinion of Gray, J.). 
 182. See, e.g., Terrill v. Rankin, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 453, 457, 1867 WL 4038, at * 3 (1867) 
(“[U]nless the order was authorized by the laws of war, it conferred on the appellee no legal authority, 
and, consequently, his act was illegal, and he is personally responsible in this action for all the 
consequences of his own unjustifiable and tortious act.”). 
 183. See Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142, 151, 1867 WL 5117, at **5 (1867). 
 184. During this earlier era, there were some kinds of permissible damages suits or claims that did 
not arise on the U.S. home front. Perhaps the most important example of this occurred when U.S. 
vessels during wartime seized vessels that allegedly belonged to the enemy or contained enemy cargo, 
and then brought them before a federal court sitting in its admiralty jurisdiction as a “prize” court, 
seeking to have the vessel condemned by the court and sold for profit. The courts could and did award 
damages through a kind of cross-claim if the U.S. officials acted wrongfully by, for example, seizing a 
vessel that was in fact owned by an American or a neutral noncitizen instead of an enemy. See, e.g., 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79 (1804) (explaining that a neutral noncitizen was 
awarded damages because the U.S. naval commander lacked statutory authorization to seize his vessel). 
 185. See cases cited supra note 1. 
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actions against federal officials, there was another significant difference 
between these suits and the modern Bivens suits that must be considered 
relevant to the doctrinal equilibration. The earlier suits against U.S. 
officials arose under the common law, not, as in modern practice, under 
federal statutes or the Constitution.
186
 If federal law entered the case, it was 
as a defense asserted by the officials, and the courts would need to 
determine whether the officials’ conduct was authorized by that law. When 
the Constitution was invoked defensively, officers were deemed to have 
exceeded their authority and acted illegally if the courts found that they 
violated the Constitution or that the statute or other authorization for their 
conduct was unconstitutional. 
Although it is difficult to prove this, it appears likely that the vast 
majority of federal officer suits were resolved without a court ever making 
a widely-noticed, published ruling on the constitutionality of the official 
conduct. This is significant, because it means that the judiciary was not 
announcing constitutional policy that might have to be prospectively 
followed by the federal government in similar cases going forward. The 
victim was compensated (or not, according to how the jury or the judge 
saw the case), but federal policymakers could continue to independently 
formulate policy. Surely both policymakers and lower level officials would 
be influenced—appropriately so—by judicial rulings or jury verdicts 
holding that a given policy or action violated an individual’s common law 
rights, both because of the deterrent effect of a potential damages judgment 
against them, and also because of the authority of the court’s declaration of 
what the law was. But as both a practical and a legal matter, federal 
officials were much more free to press forward with a policy declared to 
violate a common law individual right than they would be if a policy were 
held to be unconstitutional. 
In a Bivens case, the substance of the cause of action is the federal 
Constitution, and hence these cases pervasively involve federal courts 
pronouncing rules and doctrines of law and whether official policies or 
practices violate them. This is of course a very good thing in many 
circumstances. If officials are engaging in conduct that a court would hold 
violates the Constitution, it is often highly desirable that they be told this, 
either in a suit directly against them or in a published judicial opinion 
which states rules applicable to their conduct. But as discussed in Part VI 
below, when the executive is taking actions in national security and foreign 
relations contexts, especially when abroad, an active judicial role 
 
 186. Compare cases cited supra notes 1, 177–180. 
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pronouncing binding constitutional law might not be seen by relevant 
actors—the executive, Congress, the federal courts—as a straightforward 
good. 
B.  THE DECLINE OF TORT DAMAGES AND RISE OF ALTERNATE REMEDIES 
AGAINST OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT 
Over the last century or so, the common law tort suit for damages has 
gone from a primary way that federal officers were held accountable to a 
nullity, while the suit for prospective coercive relief against a government 
official has gone from playing a limited and humble role (deploying state 
or common law) to a mighty and pervasive role (deploying federal law) in 
judicial review. Understanding the comprehensive nature of these 
inversions over time provides explanatory context for the Court’s apparent 
view today that an individual damages remedy under Bivens is not 
constitutionally required so long as other remedies, very broadly 
understood, provide sufficient assurance of the rule of law within the 
executive.  
As noted in the previous section, the common law tort suit for money 
damages was a primary remedy against official misconduct for decades 
after the Founding, though suits seeking equitable or otherwise coercive 
remedies under state law or common law were also used.187 Federal law 
came to displace state law governing the substance of the action for a 
variety of complex reasons. Ideological changes relating to federalism 
probably played a role. The old view that state governments and state laws 
were a bulwark or protection against federal oppression was inverted by the 
experiences of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Reconstruction 
amendments to the Constitution. 
The 1875 enactment of general federal question jurisdiction gave 
plaintiffs an incentive to affirmatively plead violations of federal law, 
rather than wait for defendants to raise it as defense of justification.188 The 
Ex parte Young doctrine developed in the early twentieth century, allowing 
 
 187. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification 
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1871–72 (2010) 
(summarizing the common law writs that could be used against government officials). During the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, common law suits against federal officials were an important form 
of ordinary administrative law. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: 
Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1669–70 (2008); Jerry 
L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1321–31 (2006). 
 188. Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 396, 399 (1987). 
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official State action to be enjoined when it conflicted with the U.S. 
Constitution, through suits filed nominally against state officials.189 Federal 
judges came to incorporate many provisions of the Bill of Rights against 
the state and local governments through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, creating an ever denser web of judicially enforced 
federal constitutional law which restrained state and local officials when 
they interfered with property rights.
190
 As these new federal constitutional 
rights expanded, they began to cover more and different interests than the 
common law did, making the common law seem increasingly inadequate to 
the job of fully enforcing the Constitution.191  
Starting in the mid-twentieth century, the enforcement of these ever-
increasing federal constitutional rights was given a huge boost by the 
Court’s invigoration of the damages suit against state and local officials 
under 42 U.S.C § 1983.192 State and local abuses thus regularly came 
before the federal courts for correction under the federal Constitution. 
Since federal constitutional law directed at state and local officials had 
become such a prominent part of the docket of the federal courts, it might 
have seemed increasingly anachronistic in suits about the conduct of the 
U.S. government and its officials to allow state law to restrain the federal 
government. 
Another factor was the end of the era of general common law. Prior to 
the Court’s landmark decision in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,193 
both state and federal courts applied a general common law to regulate both 
private actors and government officials.194 When Erie announced that there 
is no “federal general common law” but only the law of particular 
sovereigns,
195
 this hinted at the federalism and separation of powers strains 
involved when courts held federal officers accountable under the common 
 
 189. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156–57, 167–68 (1908) (holding that an injunction 
against a state official did not violate the state sovereign immunity because the official was not acting 
behalf of the state when he sought to enforce an unconstitutional law). 
 190. See Rosen, supra note 154, at 1515. 
 191. See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 126, at 68 (“So long as federal constitutional rights were 
thought of as analogues to common-law concepts, the common-law damages remedies available under 
state law would have seemed adequate. As the Court began to think of federal rights and remedies as 
more than common-law concepts, independent federal damage actions seemed appropriate . . . .”). 
 192. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). 
 193. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 194. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 12, at 539–42 (pointing to the Erie decision as a reason 
for the decline of the common law tort suit against federal officials); James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, 
and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1387, 1415 (2010) 
(same). 
 195. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
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law.196 
Over the first several decades of the twentieth century, it began to 
seem important to have a systematic way to regulate and restrain the 
greatly increased and professionalized federal workforce produced by the 
growth of the administrative state.
197
 Then in 1946, Congress enacted an 
important statute to take the place of tort suits as administrative regulation. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provided for judicial review of 
many federal agency actions via suits for injunctive and declaratory 
remedies against federal agencies or federal officers in their official 
capacity, but did not allow suits for money damages.198 The growth in size 
and professionalization also meant that wrongs by federal officials came to 
seem less as trespasses by wayward individuals, and more like actions of 
the sovereign. Also in 1946, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.199 The FTCA provided a waiver of sovereign immunity, substituting 
the United States as a defendant in place of federal employees when they 
were sued for state law torts committed within the scope of their 
employment.
200
 The FTCA was a decisive move away from individual 
liability under state tort law for federal officials.201 Congress completed the 
transition from state tort law to federal law as being the primary regulator 
 
 196. As Erie is conventionally understood, federalism was implicated because state law was 
binding and controlling federal officials, in an inversion of the usual presumption of federal supremacy. 
And separation of powers was implicated because courts were creating and imposing law to restrain 
executive officials without legislative approval. For a revisionist account of the meaning of Erie, see 
generally, Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008), and Craig Green, Erie 
and Problems of Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661 (2008). 
 197. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 198. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). See also David Zaring, Personal Liability as Administrative Law, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 323 (2009) (attributing the decline in state law tort suits against federal 
officers in part to the enactment of the APA). It should be noted that APA review is not available for 
many national security activities, and even where available, the doctrines controlling entitlement to 
relief are loose enough that courts have substantial flexibility to defer to the government on national 
security or foreign affairs matters. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1106–31 (2009). 
 199. Federal Tort Claims Act, Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47. See also Act of 
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 982–85 (repealing and reenacting the FTCA as part of 
comprehensive bill reorganizing the federal judiciary). 
 200. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 201. The shift away from state law tort suits and toward the APA and FTCA as the primary means 
of regulating federal official conduct was in keeping with concomitantly developing notions about the 
function and constitutional status of tort law. It was increasingly common to see tort law not as a private 
right to choose to redress an individual wrong, but rather as public law, a form of public regulation of 
official conduct, to be shaped by public values such as efficient deterrence of antisocial conduct and 
loss-spreading. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 581–83 (2005). 
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of federal official illegality when, in the 1988 Westfall Act, it made the 
FTCA the exclusive remedy for nonconstitutional suits against federal 
officials acting within the scope of their employment.202 
At the same time as it was gradually moving from common law and 
state law tort to modern day federal administrative law as the primary 
means of ensuring executive branch accountability to law, the Court also 
effectuated a related sweeping reversal, which helps explain its currently 
skeptical view about the importance of money damages suits. In suits 
against government officials, judicial doctrine used to privilege money 
damages over coercive remedies like injunctions. As the Court said in 
Bivens, “[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy 
for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”203 Generally speaking, 
throughout the nineteenth century “[w]here review was by mandamus or 
injunction, courts were unwilling to review to the extent that the statute 
provided the administrative officer any discretion.”204 Thus, injunctions 
and mandamus were available only where positive law (a statute or well-
defined common law) precisely specified the duty of the officer. 
The availability of equitable relief has always turned on the 
inadequacy of a legal (generally money damages) remedy.205 There were 
both constitutional and prudential or institutional reasons for the traditional 
preference for damages over equitable remedies in suits against the 
government. The constitutional reason centered around the important role 
of the civil jury.206 The prudential or institutional reasons related to the 
judiciary’s hesitation about getting entangled in directing state or federal 
 
 202. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 203. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 
(1971). 
 204. Jerry L. Mashaw, The American Model of Federal Administrative Law: Remembering the 
First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 987 (2010). 
 205. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided “[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of 
the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at 
law.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82. This provision was carried forward in the 
Revised Statutes section 723, see Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 150 (1891) (describing this 
recodification), and only dropped when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created in 1938. 
However, the requirement that damages (or other remedies at law) be deemed inadequate before 
equitable relief be forthcoming has continued to this day in judicial doctrine. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring, among other things, for a permanent 
injunction to be granted, “that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury”). 
 206. When courts sit in equity, a jury is not needed unless certain special facts must be found; 
federal courts should not allow a suit in equity when a suit in law is adequate because that would 
circumvent the jury, which is constitutionally protected by the Seventh Amendment. Whitehead, 138 
U.S. at 150–51. 
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executive officials on how to do their jobs.207 
But, together with Congress, the Court gradually came to invert the 
old remedial hierarchy to favor injunctive-type relief over money damages. 
The shift of administrative law from being heavily tort or damages based to 
the modern APA regime of injunctions, mandamus, and declaratory 
judgments was discussed above.208 The law of government searches and 
seizures is another area where the Court has shifted its regulation of 
government officials from damages imposed after jury trials to equitable 
remedies and judge-only procedures.209 Civil rights litigation under the 
Constitution is yet another.210 
The development of official immunity doctrines is also a significant 
part of this story. During the Founding period and for some time 
afterwards, government officials had no immunity from a suit, either for 
damages or other relief.
211
 During the nineteenth century, the Court 
 
 207. For a modern expression of this hesitation, see City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 
(1983). 
 208. Under the APA, jury trials are absent and courts reviewing agency actions may issue 
remedies taking the forms of mandatory and prohibitory injunctions and declaratory relief, but may not 
award money damages. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2012). 
 209. As originally understood, the Fourth Amendment did not require warrants (which, like today, 
were issued ex parte by judicial officers at the request of the constable), and presupposed that the 
primary enforcement against search and seizure abuses would be by a common law trespass suit tried 
before a local jury. Warrants did not wholly immunize constables in tort suits. See Richard M. Re, The 
Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1919–20 (2014). Today, the Court has 
developed a warrant “requirement,” treats a validly issued warrant as establishing the legality of the 
search or seizure for almost all purposes, and enforces the Fourth Amendment primarily with the 
exclusionary rule, a remedy controlled entirely by judges, not juries. Moreover, common law tort suits 
against federal officers are barred in many circumstances and, although Bivens suits directly under the 
Fourth Amendment are available (one of the very few areas where the Court has allowed Bivens suits), 
they are subject to qualified immunity and other progovernment defenses and doctrines administered by 
judges. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 210. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1112 
(2010) (stating that since Brown v. Board of Education, injunctive relief has become “the norm, rather 
than the exception, in cases seeking to enforce broadly shared rights the value of which would be hard 
to quantify”); Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of 
Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931, 936 (2010) (“[T]he Court has articulated a preference, at least 
rhetorically, for injunctive relief in civil rights cases.”). 
The Court’s invigoration of state sovereign immunity from damages suits in recent years is well known. 
However, unconstitutional actions of the states and federal government can be and are routinely 
enjoined through the non-statutory Ex parte Young doctrine under which an officer is sued and enjoined 
on the theory that actions which violate the Constitution are not truly authorized government actions, 
but unauthorized private wrongs. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156–57, 167–68 (1908). The Ex parte 
Young doctrine, although developed by the Court in suits against state officials, has long been applied to 
allow injunctions against the federal government (nominally against federal officers) notwithstanding 
sovereign immunity. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 211. See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–20 (1972); Woolhandler, supra note 188, at 414–21. 
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developed immunity doctrines that, while there were many complexities 
and changes over time, can be fairly summarized as providing more 
protection from prospective and coercive suits than from damages suits.212 
In the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the Court gradually 
inverted this, so that eventually, official immunity doctrines provided little 
or no protection to local, state, or federal officials from prospective and 
coercive relief, while robust immunity rules tightly limited money damages 
suits, first under the common law and then also under the Constitution.213 
These robust immunities (sovereign and individual) from money 
damages suits have the effect of making injunctive relief more readily 
available, because of the test that injunctions shall not issue when legal 
remedies are adequate.214 For many decades, courts have also routinely 
presumed that a violation of constitutional rights is an “irreparable injury” 
under the test for getting an injunction.215 Richard Fallon has concluded 
that “[t]he Court . . . has treated suits for injunctions against ongoing 
constitutional violations strikingly different from Bivens actions. . . . [T]he 
post-Brown Court, so far as I am aware, has never suggested that 
injunctions against ongoing constitutional violations are constitutionally 
problematic in the way it now believes Bivens actions to be.”216 
By the latter part of the twentieth century, federal substantive law had 
displaced the common law and state law as the primary way that federal 
official illegality was measured; the suit for money damages against federal 
officials had been largely eclipsed by APA review and other types of suits 
for prospective coercive relief; and the locus of decisionmaking shifted 
away from juries and into the hands of judges. Given these epochal shifts, 
one can better understand why the modern Supreme Court came to view 
 
 212. See Woolhandler, supra note 188, at 449–52 & n.280. 
 213. Compare id. at 460–70 (tracing the development robust official immunity from damages 
suits) with Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (noting that qualified immunity 
for officials does not bar “a suit to enjoin future conduct”). 
 214. See Karlan, supra note 21, at 1328–29 (making this point with regard to state sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); Reinert, supra note 210, at 939 (same). Both Reinert and 
Karlan emphasize, however, that the Court has cut back on the availability of injunctions to enforce 
civil rights claims in a variety of ways. See. e.g., Reinert, supra note 210, at 935. 
 215. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental 
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 231 & n.132 (2012). 
 216. Fallon, supra note 210, at 1113. This still seems true today, though there are some recent 
indications that the Court may be tightening up slightly the availability of injunctive relief, by making 
the test for issuing an injunction more determinate and rule-like, see Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra 
note 215, at 214, perhaps to facilitate appellate oversight and correction, and by reversing several times 
and criticizing lower court decisions which in any way presumed that an injunction could be issued, see, 
e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2757–58, 2761 (2010); Munaf v. Geren, 
553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008). 
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the Bivens remedy as essentially optional rather than constitutionally 
mandatory—because the Court is now more focused on systemically 
maintaining the rule of federal law within the executive branch through law 
declaration and coercive, prospective remedies, rather than through 
individual remediation and redress. 
VI.  REASONS FOR CAUTION ABOUT DAMAGES IN NATIONAL 
SECURITY CASES 
Parts IV and V explored large structural changes in the role of the 
judiciary and its methods of operation over the last hundred plus years that 
help explain why the modern Court generally prefers injunctive-type 
remedies to damages in suits against the government. This part discusses 
reasons why courts might be particularly cautious about allowing Bivens 
damages suits in cases involving national security and foreign affairs. 
The Court believes that damages suits and the concomitant discovery 
burdens and threats of personal liability are likely to waste officials’ time, 
cause excessive caution in the performance of official duties, and deter 
good people from entering government service, and there are some reasons 
to think that these concerns are heightened in national security and foreign 
affairs cases. The courts might well believe that the executive branch is 
adequately constrained in the national security area by mechanisms other 
than damages lawsuits. And allowing Bivens suits in the national security 
and foreign relations areas will greatly increase the size of the pool of 
potential plaintiffs who can challenge the constitutionality of the 
executive’s conduct, subject the government to litigation and potential law 
declaration it will be unable to moot by conceding individual relief, and 
force courts to make difficult determinations about whether and how 
constitutional rights should apply abroad and outside the ordinary 
peacetime contexts for which they were developed. These features, many 
of which are arguably unique to suits seeking damages remedies, help 
explain why the courts’ recent assertiveness is expressed primarily in suits 
seeking coercive rather than damages remedies. If one is concerned about 
the judicialization and constitutionalization of foreign relations and 
national security, for some or all of the reasons raised by the courts of 
appeals and canvassed in Section III.A, this judicial caution about 
extending Bivens is desirable. 
But that is not to say that such caution should necessarily trump 
competing values, such as vindication of constitutional rights, redress of 
injuries or deterrence of official law-breaking. This part does not aim to 
weigh and balance all competing interests but merely offer reasons, some 
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of them heretofore unexplored, that might support the courts’ stance toward 
Bivens in the national security and foreign affairs contexts. 
A.  “SOCIAL COSTS” OF DAMAGES LIABILITY FOR GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS 
The Supreme Court’s case law on official immunity expressly 
highlights a number of consequences it sees as flowing from damages 
liability. Robust official immunity for individual officials sued personally 
is justified by the Court because of the “cost[,] not only to the defendant 
officials, but to society as a whole,” of damages suits and the prospect of 
individual liability.217 The cost that appears to most worry the Court is 
often called “overdeterrence,” which occurs when the fear of personal 
damages liability discourages the vigorous, efficient, and socially 
beneficial performance of official functions, either because there is some 
doubt about what the law requires or there is a prospect of meritless but 
nevertheless costly damages suits.218 It is a frequent trope of discussions of 
national security and foreign affairs that the political branches, in particular 
the executive, must be able to act quickly, vigorously, and flexibly to meet 
dangerous and unforeseen or changing circumstances.219 In keeping with 
this precept, Iqbal implied that the social cost of overdeterrence might be 
especially high when “high-level officials” are sued because of their 
actions in response to “a national and international security emergency,”220 
 
 217. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
 218. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 734 (stating that modern official immunity doctrine “is 
designed primarily to avoid dampening the vigor of officials in the performance of their duties”); PETER 
H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 16–20 (1983) 
(describing how overdeterrence could occur in practice); Jeffries, supra note 137, at 269 (“Current 
doctrine rests squarely on the overdeterrence rationale.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375–76 (2000); Haig v. 
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291–92 (1981); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–
20 (1936). 
 220. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009) (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that 
officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable 
time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the 
Government. The costs of diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with 
responding to . . . ‘a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the 
American Republic’” (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., 
concurring))). See also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086–87 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“When faced with inconsistent legal rules in different jurisdictions, national officeholders should be 
given some deference for qualified immunity purposes . . . .”). Other social costs of official damages 
liability cited by the Court include the likelihood of frivolous litigation, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 
219, 226–27 (1988); “the expenses of litigation,” whether frivolous or meritorious, and “the diversion 
of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of 
public office,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14; the burdens of discovery on government officials, e.g., 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685–86; Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588, 591, 593 n.14 (1998); the 
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though the Court has in the past refused to accord cabinet heads absolute 
immunity in these circumstances.221 
The Court recognizes that this immunity has downsides—individuals 
who are harmed are deprived of compensation, and “the ideal of the rule of 
law” suffers222—but overall, the Court weighs the policy balance to favor 
very strong official immunity. Indeed, in qualified immunity cases, the 
Court frequently discourses about the myriad harms of damages actions 
against individual officers.223 When it initially created the Bivens remedy, 
the Court saw it is fulfilling at least two purposes, compensation of a 
wronged individual and deterrence of government misconduct.224 In recent 
decades, as it has cut back on Bivens, the Court has said it serves only one 
purpose—deterrence.225 But since the modern Court is so concerned with 
overdeterrence, especially of senior policymakers responding to national 
security crises, this purpose of Bivens is one about which the Court is very 
suspicious. 
It should be noted that the predicted “social costs” of damages 
liability, like its capacity to overdeter, are based on contested empirical 
claims.226 And, as discussed in section III.B above, there are some reasons 
 
deterrence of policymakers from giving or receiving candid and wide-ranging advice, see Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 817 n.28; and the unfairness to officials who are held personally liable for actions they took for 
the public’s benefit, sometimes under the direction of law or superior orders, and frequently in the face 
of unclear constitutional standards and challenging factual situations, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 239–40 (1974). 
 221. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985) (rejecting the argument that the U.S. 
Attorney General should have absolute immunity when performing national security functions). A few 
years before Mitchell, the Court had suggested that presidential “aides entrusted with discretionary 
authority in such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy” might need absolute immunity 
“to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 
812. 
 222. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223. See also Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988) (discussing 
this problem in the context of absolute immunity of federal officials for state law torts). 
 223. E.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685–86; Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009); Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351 n.22 (2001); Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 590 & n.12; Forrester, 
484 U.S. at 226–27; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14. 
 224. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980). 
 225. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to 
deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.”); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 485 (1994) (“It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.” (emphasis 
in original)). 
 226. See Fallon, supra note 43, at 495–97. A number of recent theoretical and empirical efforts 
have been made to begin to remedy the problem of lack of solid information about actual governmental 
practices. See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter 
Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 587, 587–96 (2000); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347 (2000); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and 
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to suspect that the most senior executive policymakers are unlikely to be 
bothered by any fear of personal financial liability. They could, of course, 
still fear discovery of sensitive information about them or their actions, the 
diversion of their time, and other costs cited by the Court. 
B.  DISCOVERY BURDENS  
The potential release of sensitive and closely-held information through 
discovery is a concern for the government in almost any civil or criminal 
lawsuit, but these concerns are dramatically heightened in the national 
security and foreign relations contexts. At the same time, using court-
ordered discovery to force out information the government wants to keep 
secret is more appealing for ideologically oriented litigants in national 
security and foreign relations contexts, because traditional means by which 
internal government information is released, such as voluntary agency 
disclosure or FOIA,
227
 are much more limited in these contexts.228 
Discovery in Bivens cases can be more intrusive and burdensome for 
government officials than in other types of suits. Only in Bivens suits are 
government officials sued personally. As the Supreme Court has explained, 
even though qualified immunity rules are designed to screen out meritless 
suits before imposing the costs of discovery on government officials, 
“limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the district court 
can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity.”229 If the official is not entitled to have the suit dismissed on 
qualified immunity grounds, he or she may be deposed and will need to 
turn over emails and other individual documents to the plaintiffs.230 Bivens 
liability for senior officials is only available for “the official’s own 
individual actions” and intentions, not on the basis of respondeat 
 
Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1023, 1028 (2010). 
 227. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 228. Litigants with weak Bivens claims might be tempted to sue because they assume that the 
government would often rather settle than produce sensitive information in discovery. 
 229. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 & n.14 (1998). 
 230. See id. at 598 (noting that if the Bivens suit is not dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, 
“the plaintiff ordinarily will be entitled to some discovery”). Dozens of depositions of government 
officials were taken by the plaintiffs in the Bivens litigation about immigration detentions during the 
investigation of the 9/11 attacks. See United States’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Objections to Chief 
Magistrate Judge Gold’s Order Entered on December 20, 2007, at 3 & n.3, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (Nos. 04 CV 1809, 02 CV 2307), 2008 WL 
8255274, at *2. In a conversation with plaintiffs’ counsel, I was informed that the depositions were of 
low level officials and that document production did not appear to impinge directly on the senior 
officials sued. 
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superior,231 and so plaintiffs must be entitled to discover what exactly each 
individual defendant thought and did. 
In a habeas, injunctive, or declaratory case, it is frequently the case 
that an entire statute, rule or policy is challenged and there may be less 
need to dig into the individual files or personal recollections of government 
officials. Perhaps for this reason, and in order to generate publicity and 
impose costs on officials, ideologically motivated litigation outfits quite 
often name very senior policymakers as defendants in Bivens suits.232 The 
post-9/11 suits have named as defendants the Attorney General, FBI 
director, CIA director, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, 
and others.
233
 The Supreme Court has frequently warned about the “evils” 
of “[d]iscovery involving public officials,”234 and not surprisingly appears 
more concerned about this when very senior officials or national security or 
foreign relations subject matters are involved.235 The potentially heightened 
discovery burden in Bivens litigation is thus another reason the Court may 
be skeptical about extending Bivens into the national security and foreign 
relations contexts. In fact, the Court has frequently cited the burdens of 
participating in discovery and other aspects of litigation as a reason to grant 
qualified immunity to government officials.236 One should note, however, 
that in practice, lower court judges may make discretionary rulings that 
serve to protect very senior officials from direct discovery burdens.
237
 
C.  SUBSTITUTABILITY OF “REMEDIES” BROADLY UNDERSTOOD  
The Supreme Court has suggested that it has very wide discretion, in 
choosing how it will act to maintain the rule of law in the executive branch, 
to take into account the presence of alternate remedial schemes, understood 
 
 231. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). 
 232. See Zaring, supra note 198, at 331–37 (suggesting that many Bivens suits against senior 
policymakers are filed to generate publicity, symbolize the subjugation of high officials to the law, 
impose personal costs on officials thought to have violated the law, and to obtain court-ordered 
discovery). 
 233. Id. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 234. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593 n.14. 
 235. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (noting that the costs of discovery to the government are 
“only magnified” when the relevant officials are tasked with responding to national security threats like 
9/11); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 & n.28 (1982) (“In suits against a President’s closest 
aides, discovery of this kind frequently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns.”). Cf. Ashcroft 
v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086–87 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining why qualified 
immunity protection is particularly important for national policymakers responding to security 
emergencies). 
 236. See cases cited supra note 220. 
 237. See, e.g., Kyle Eng’g Co. v. Kleppe, 600 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Heads of 
government agencies are not normally subject to deposition.”). 
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in a very broad way as encompassing not only alternate judicial remedies. 
This might be called the substitutability of remedies.  
Outside the national security area, the Court has frequently justified 
restrictions on one type of suit against the government by pointing to the 
availability of a different type of lawsuit.238 And when the Court justifies 
restrictions on certain remedies, it often points not only to alternate judicial 
remedies, but also to nonjudicial institutions and practices that keep the 
executive within check. For instance, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court 
explained its new rule of absolute immunity for the president from civil 
suits related to official functions would “not leave the Nation without 
sufficient protection against misconduct” because impeachment, “constant 
scrutiny by the press,” “[v]igilant oversight by Congress,” and desires for 
reelection, “prestige” and “historical stature” would provide sufficient 
“formal and informal checks.”239 There are numerous other examples 
where the Court took this broad view of “substitutability of remedies,” 
disallowing individual damages suits because nonjudicial checks were 
sufficient to ensure executive accountability to law.240  
This seems to occur in national security and foreign affairs contexts as 
well. Chappell v. Wallace, a putative Bivens suit by enlisted servicemen 
against their officers for race discrimination, shows the Court taking a very 
broad view of the substitutability of remedies. The Court there declined to 
extend Bivens, relying very heavily on the fact that the military justice 
system provided remedies.241 There was no mechanism to seek money 
 
 238. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (noting that although states may not be 
sued by individuals because of sovereign immunity, the federal government may still sue); City of L.A. 
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111–13 (1983) (imposing restrictive standing rules to bar suit for injunction but 
noting availability of damages suit). 
Many critics contend that the promise of an alternate remedy is often a hollow one. See, e.g., Rudovsky, 
supra note 32, at 1212–13 (“Alternatives are promised, but they are often denied, unavailable in 
practice, or riddled with exceptions that seriously undermine their effectiveness.”). 
 239. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982). 
 240. In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Court noted that one reason that the 
exclusionary rule should not be applied to “knock-and-announce” Fourth Amendment violations by the 
police was that “the increasing professionalism of police forces” helped “deter[] civil-rights violations” 
like the one at issue. Id. at 598. Another example of a broad view of the substitutability of remedies 
come from the Court’s justifications for prosecutors having absolute immunity from damages suits. See 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976) (suggesting that damages suits are not necessary 
because professional oversight bodies, judicial review within the criminal process, and other 
mechanisms will ensure that prosecutors follow the law). 
 241. As described by the Court, that system allowed aggrieved enlisted men to petition their 
commanding officer, an officer exercising court-martial jurisdiction or, if the dispute involved the 
accuracy of military records, the Board for the Correction of Naval Records, and ask those persons or 
entities to investigate and provide what relief they saw fit. Only the Board’s decisions concerning 
records disputes could be reviewed by any third party or court (judicial review under an arbitrary and 
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damages or remedies in the nature of an injunction, declaratory judgment, 
or mandamus. And there was no way to initiate judicial review in the first 
instance. Yet the Court found this system sufficient enough to obviate any 
need for Bivens, suggesting that system-wide rule of law rather than 
effective individual redress was its goal. 
In United States v. Stanley, the LSD military case, the Court declined 
to allow Bivens but noted that Stanley had filed an administrative claim 
with the Army and an FTCA suit. Both were denied or dismissed, but the 
Court seemed to think the mere existence of those systems was noteworthy. 
The Court also noted the possibility that Stanley would get some kind of 
statutory veteran’s benefits, but did not say how likely this was or suggest 
that this would have provided compensation for the tortious injuries he had 
allegedly suffered.242 All the justices agreed that Stanley could not pursue a 
state law tort claim.
243
 Despite the manifest inadequacy of all of these 
alternate remedies, the Court denied his request to allow a Bivens claim.
244
 
The Court’s recent decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 
provides another interesting example.245 Plaintiffs who alleged a fear that 
their communications could be intercepted under a provision of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) were denied standing by the 
Court.
246
 An important part of the rationale concerned the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”). Congress created this special 
court, staffed with Article III judges, to review ex ante and ex parte the 
executive branch’s requests to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance.247 
Although proceedings before the FISC are secret, news reports and 
information gleaned from the few public opinions issued by FISC judges 
suggest that there is an ongoing and reasonably robust dialogue between 
FISC judges and executive branch attorneys who specialize in FISA to 
review the legality of surveillance.248 In Clapper, the Supreme Court 
 
capricious administrative law standard). See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302–04 (1983). See 
also supra Part II. 
 242. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 672, 675 (1987). 
 243. Id. at 670–71. 
 244. Id. at 686. 
 245. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 246. Id. at 1142–43. 
 247. Id. at 1143. 
 248. Many critics argue that the FISC is a rubber stamp because it has apparently rarely formally 
denied a government request. My admittedly impressionistic and incomplete sense gathered from 
talking to people with knowledge of the process and reviewing leaked documents is that Gary Schmitt 
is correct that one “reason the court has such a high rate of warrant approvals is almost certainly that the 
layer of government lawyering required to bring a request forward is already extensive, and the 
evidentiary requirements for a request itself are such that most FISC approvals are easily decided.” 
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implied that it need not find that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their 
constitutional litigation against the government because the Article III 
judges of the FISC were already providing sufficient judicial review to 
ensure that the executive obeyed the law.249 This is essentially a 
substitutability of remedies rationale. 
It seems plausible that, in the national security area, when considering 
whether to authorize additional remedies (or find that plaintiffs have 
standing to invoke already existing remedies), the Court takes a system-
wide view of whether the totality of its law-declaring actions, plus any 
remedial and oversight regimes put in place by court order, statute, or 
executive order, provide sufficient assurance that the rule of law and 
separation of powers prevail. This very loose view of the substitutability of 
remedies implicitly presupposes that the Constitution does not require that 
any particular plaintiff have anything more robust or individualized, like a 
Bivens remedy. As noted above, it is quite controversial and not well 
understood what remedial baseline or floor the Constitution requires. It 
seems likely that, in the specialized contexts of national security and 
foreign relations, especially actions overseas affecting noncitizens or in 
conflict zones, the constitutional rules about the minimally sufficient 
remedies are even more relaxed than in the domestic sphere of workaday 
government activities. 
A very broad view of the substitutability of remedies—seeing money 
damages suits as only one among many legal and nonlegal means of 
constraining the executive branch to obey the law—might be particularly 
appropriate in the area of national security, given recent developments in 
law and legal and political culture. In an important 2012 book, Jack 
Goldsmith describes the profusion of forms of accountability that have 
increasingly developed within and around the modern executive branch in 
the national security area in the years since 9/11.250 He calls this an 
“ecology of transparency”251 and provides a rich description of its many 
components—including framework statutes enacted by Congress which 
contain oversight mechanisms and criminal prohibitions; criminal trials of 
 
Gary Schmitt, Don’t Save This Court, WEEKLY STANDARD (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/don-t-save-court_741008.html. Some recently disclosed 
documents also suggest that the FISC has been willing to push back against the government. See 
Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Secret Court Rebuked N.S.A. on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/2011-ruling-found-an-nsa-program-unconstitutional. 
html. 
 249. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150, 1154. 
 250. GOLDSMITH, supra note 128. 
 251. Id. at 118. 
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wayward officials who break criminal laws; scrutiny of the legality of 
policy by empowered and relatively independent lawyers within the 
executive branch such as general counsels and the Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps; independent inspector generals within agencies reporting 
to Congress and authorized to ferret out waste and abuse; congressional 
committee reporting requirements and congressional investigations; 
internal accountability board review proceedings and ethics investigations; 
FOIA proceedings; and “public criticism and calumny” brought on by a 
vigorous investigative press which excels at obtaining leaks about possible 
illegalities and an active NGO community.252  
As Goldsmith’s interviews with current and former executive officials 
make clear, these mechanisms of accountability “impose various forms of 
psychological, professional, reputational, financial, and political costs on 
those held accountable,”253 and have inhibiting effects on the willingness of 
executive officials to push the envelope.254 He concludes that, as a result of 
this ecology of transparency, which has proliferated in the decade since 
9/11, the executive branch is reasonably well “fettered” and kept within the 
bounds of law.255 
Though Goldsmith lists “civil trials” as part of his detailed description 
of post-9/11 accountability, the book barely addresses them,
256
 and for 
good reason. As we have seen, Bivens suits have played a relatively small 
role in the national security area because the courts of appeals have not 
allowed them to go forward.
257
 Goldsmith’s account of the effectiveness of 
this new ecology of transparency provides interesting context for thinking 
about the way the courts have equilibrated doctrine in the national security 
area. On the one hand, it might be said that his account undermines one of 
the Supreme Court’s most potent arguments against monetary liability for 
federal officials—the fear that it will “overdeter,” cause excessive caution 
that damages the public interest, especially in the national security area 
where boldness is arguably more necessary.258 It might seem far-fetched to 
think that a civil tort suit will by itself cause significant overdeterrence for, 
say, a senior CIA official who is also worried about investigations by the 
inspector general, DOJ prosecutors, and an internal accountability board; 
 
 252. Id. at 118–21, 235. 
 253. Id. at 235. 
 254. Id. at 239 (“Everyone in the CIA, and every national security lawyer in the government, 
knows that the threshold of sin has lowered.”). 
 255. Id. at 211, 239. 
 256. Id. at 235. 
 257. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 258. For discussion of the theory of overdeterrence, see supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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congressional scrutiny; foreign civil and criminal trials ginned up by 
NGOs; and public scrutiny in the press or NGO reports. This is especially 
the case if, as seems likely, the official has personal liability insurance or 
can request reimbursement of costs and indemnification from his agency, 
or both.259 It is likely true, as Goldsmith suggests, that all of these 
accountability mechanisms put together have caused some overdeterrence. 
But it does not seem credible that civil torts suits would alone tip the 
balance from appropriate deterrence to overdeterrence. 
On the other hand, if the Court does evaluate the need for remedies by 
looking system-wide at whether the rule of law prevails, this thick new web 
of accountability mechanisms in the national security area described by 
Goldsmith might suggest that Bivens is largely unnecessary. This latter 
view would gain traction if Bivens litigation were perceived to be uniquely 
costly.  
D.  EFFECTS OF THE TRANSREMEDIAL ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS  
Allowing constitutional claims to be asserted through damages 
litigation might pose unique concerns in the national security and foreign 
relations areas. Compared to injunctive-type suits, the executive would 
have much less ability to control or moot damages litigation; the pool of 
potential plaintiffs would be much larger; and courts might be forced to 
change the definitions of constitutional rights in undesirable ways. The 
Court’s approach to litigation against the government—focusing on 
system-wide rule of law rather than individual redress, intervening 
occasionally but forcefully in injunctive-type cases while being cognizant 
of reasons for judicial caution in the areas of national security and foreign 
affairs—suggests that these factors could be considered reasons to disfavor 
damages suits. 
The Supreme Court’s failure to extend Bivens to most constitutional 
rights and contexts is notable in our constitutional system because where 
state and local officials are involved, almost all substantive constitutional 
rights can generally be enforced both offensively and defensively, as both a 
sword and shield, in suits seeking both retrospective relief such as damages 
and prospective relief such as injunctions. “Offensive” enforcement occurs 
when an injured private individual chooses to initiate legal proceedings 
against the (allegedly) responsible government official seeking a remedy. 
“Defensive” enforcement occurs when the government initiates legal 
proceedings against a private individual, and the (alleged) rights violation 
 
 259. See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text. 
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with its attached remedy, if there is one, is raised to block or limit the 
government’s legal options. Offensive enforcement can generally seek 
either prospective or retrospective remedies. For instance, in a § 1983 suit, 
Congress has authorized plaintiffs to initiate suits seeking both damages 
from the state and local officials and, if the official misconduct is 
continuing or threatens to be repeated, injunctions. On the other hand, 
defensive enforcement generally seeks relief that is injunctive in nature and 
usually best described as prospective. For instance, when a criminal 
defendant raises a claim that the police violated his constitutional rights 
during a search of his house, the remedy is the exclusion of evidence from 
the upcoming trial—essentially an injunction against the government’s 
future use of the evidence. 
To coin an admittedly awkward phrase, we could say that 
constitutional rights against state and local government officials are 
generally enforced in a transremedial fashion—both offensively and 
defensively, and both prospectively and retrospectively—while rights 
against federal officials are not, because of limitations on Bivens.260 
Individuals whose rights are injured by federal officials have essentially all 
the same remedies in defensive litigation as do individuals injured by state 
and local officials, but the availability of remedies in offensive litigation 
differs greatly between the federal and state and local contexts due to the 
Bivens doctrine. 
The choice of whether the enforcement of substantive constitutional 
rights against government officials will be transremedial has important 
consequences along several dimensions. The size of the pool of potential 
litigants who can invoke a given constitutional right will be vastly different 
depending on whether the rights enforcement is transremedial. The 
executive can unilaterally choose to moot injunctive-type suits, giving an 
individual relief and avoiding law declaration, but cannot unilaterally moot 
a damages suit. And in a system where rights against officials are generally 
enforced transremedially, the resulting litigation in multiple remedial 
contexts has the potential to change the definitions of the substantive 
rights—and not always in desirable ways. It seems appropriate that the 
Supreme Court and courts of appeals confronting the question whether to 
extend Bivens consider these consequences—and they almost certainly are 
doing so already. 
 
 260. The focus on suing government officials obviates the need to discuss complex issues about 
suing sovereigns directly. 
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1.  Executive Control 
Government officials have a substantially lesser ability to control or 
influence whether the litigation will occur in the offensive setting. If 
constitutional rights can be litigated only defensively, government officials 
can choose not to initiate the formal legal proceedings that trigger the 
ability to use the constitutional right defensively. By definition, it is the 
private individual who chooses whether to initiate offensive constitutional 
litigation. 
The type of remedy matters as well. When an injunction or habeas 
relief is sought, the executive has the unilateral option to moot the suit by 
consenting to the requested relief. The executive often trades off individual 
relief in this way to avoid law declaration that will have systemic, far-
reaching effects.261 This executive safety valve in suits for prospective 
relief might give the courts some comfort that the executive branch does 
not view an impending law declaring judicial opinion as wholly 
unacceptable. There are still unresolved questions about the executive’s 
right to moot a damages claim by making an offer of judgment for all 
compensatory relief the plaintiff could possibly be seeking, plus fees and 
costs.262  
2.  The Size of the Plaintiff Pool 
In the national security area, the U.S. government engages in 
relatively little activity that results in defensive assertions of constitutional 
rights. Certainly, there are some criminal prosecutions for national security 
crimes, including ones that occurred abroad. But intelligence, military and 
diplomatic activities—which constitute a very large proportion of this 
country’s overseas national security activities—involve almost no 
government-initiated legal proceedings which allow constitutional rights to 
be asserted defensively. Therefore, in the national security area, there will 
be very few individuals who can assert constitutional claims against the 
U.S. government and its officials if offensive litigation is not allowed or is 
limited. 
Under current doctrine, offensive litigation seeking injunctions or 
injunctive-type relief (habeas) are widely, but by no means universally, 
available for individuals affected by U.S. national security policies. But, as 
 
 261. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528–29 (2013) (“While the 
Courts of Appeals disagree whether an unaccepted offer that fully satisfies plaintiff’s claim is sufficient 
to render the claim moot, we do not reach this question, or resolve the split . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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this Article has discussed, offensive money damages remedies (Bivens) 
have not been provided in most circumstances. Allowing Bivens in the 
national security area will substantially increase the size of the pool of 
potential plaintiffs—meaning the pool of persons who can raise 
constitutional claims offensively or defensively, whether or not they initiate 
civil lawsuits as formal plaintiffs. Rules about Article III standing and 
matters of timing mean that there is an enormous difference between the 
size of the pool of potential plaintiffs in offensive versus defensive 
constitutional litigation, and between suits seeking retrospective versus 
prospective remedies. There will always be a much larger number of 
individuals who potentially could raise claims against the government 
offensively compared to defensively, and a much larger number of 
individuals who can sue for damages than for injunctive relief. 
To simplify somewhat, an individual may seek injunctive relief only 
for so long as the government harm is occurring. That might be just a few 
instances. After it is over, the injured party will not have standing to sue for 
injunctive-type relief unless it can be shown that the government harm is 
objectively likely to recur.263 Even if the harm occurs over a longer period 
of time, and therefore, there is a greater time window during which to sue 
for injunctive relief, the government misconduct might be of a type which 
prevents the individual from reaching a lawyer or court.264 Therefore, there 
will generally be a somewhat narrow time window in which an injured 
party can be a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against government 
misconduct. The time window during which an individual injured by 
government officials may seek to be plaintiffs in a money damages suit is 
substantially, often exponentially, larger—probably at least several years 
under the relevant statute of limitations.265 In addition, it is significantly 
easier to establish standing to sue for damages than for an injunction.266  
 
 263. For cases concerning traditional injunctions, see City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106–07 
nn.7 & 8 (1983); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–97 (1974). The law regarding habeas cases is 
more complex. In ordinary criminal cases, a released detainee may still pursue a habeas petition—in 
other words, the petition is not moot—if it can be proved that there are specific ongoing collateral 
consequences of the challenged criminal conviction. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1998). 
The D.C. Circuit has been very hesitant to extend these rules to law-of-war detainees, like those at 
Guantanamo. See Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 16–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has not 
addressed this issue. 
 264. This seems even more likely to be true in national security areas than domestically, because 
the government misconduct might occur abroad, might involve extrajudicial detention, etc. A number of 
the post-9/11 Bivens plaintiffs, for instance Arar, El-Masri, and Padilla, were allegedly detained in 
manners that prevented them from seeking outside legal assistance. 
 265. The statute of limitations for Bivens and § 1983 claims is borrowed from the forum state’s 
personal injury statute. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985). 
 266. See Fallon, supra note 43, at 491 (“[P]arties who seek damages for past injuries almost never 
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As a result of this, in general, but especially in the national security 
area, the size of the pool of potential plaintiffs will always be substantially 
larger in offensive compared to defensive litigation, and in litigation 
seeking damages compared to injunctions.267 This is either a feature or a 
bug depending on one’s views about a variety of issues. In Harbury, 
Verdugo-Urquidez, and Iqbal, the Court implied that it sees it as a bug in 
the national security area.
268
 
3.  Changing Definitions of Rights When Transremedial Enforcement 
Exists 
Allowing constitutional rights to be enforced offensively as well as 
defensively and with retrospective as well as prospective remedies can lead 
courts to change the definition of the rights, and not always in rights-
protective ways. The enforcement of some important criminal procedure 
rights offensively via constitutional tort suits has been shown to have led 
the courts to reshape and cut back on the substantive right itself.269 An 
example of this dynamic is the Miranda case law.270 In other words, 
 
encounter difficulties in satisfying the demands of standing doctrine.”). 
 267. It is true that, as a practical matter, the ease of raising constitutional claims and incentives to 
do so will be greater in defensive compared to offensive litigation, especially in the criminal area—
Gideon rights mean that all individuals in defensive criminal litigation will have a lawyer, and the 
prevalence of the exclusionary rule remedy gives significant incentives to raise constitutional claims. 
See Karlan, supra note 99, at 1915–16 & n.8 (discussing the reasons that defensive constitutional 
litigation is relatively common). Offensive litigation is greatly limited in the domestic sphere by the rule 
of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), that § 1983 actions must (with minimal exceptions) be 
dismissed if a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s 
criminal conviction or imprisonment. Id. at 486–87. Lower federal courts apply the Heck rationale in 
Bivens cases. See, e.g., Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir.1997) (per curiam). In the 
national security realm, especially extraterritorially, the U.S. government is much more likely to use 
tools other than a criminal prosecution, meaning that Heck will rarely present a problem. 
 268. See supra notes 93, 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 269. For a theoretical and doctrinal investigation of this phenomenon, see generally Jennifer E. 
Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2010). 
 270. As a result of concerns about expansive § 1983 and Bivens liability, the Court in a 2003 
decision held that a Miranda violation does not occur at the time of interrogation but only later, if the 
government seeks to use the interrogation to incriminate the suspect in some way. Chavez v. Martinez, 
538 U.S. 760, 770–73 (2003) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor & Scalia, JJ.) (plurality 
opinion). See also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641–42 (2004) (Thomas, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.) (reiterating their views from Chavez). Two other justices in Chavez 
agreed that no tort suit alleging a Miranda violation should be allowed under the circumstances 
presented in Chavez, but were not prepared to agree with the plurality’s view that only use at trial itself 
would trigger a Miranda violation. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 777–78 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by 
Breyer, J.). The lower courts understand the rule to be that a Miranda violation only occurs if the fruits 
of a non-Miranda compliant interrogation are used in some way as part of a criminal case or a threat of 
criminal liability. See, e.g., Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1024–25 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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doctrinal equilibration occurs, as predicted by Fallon and others, whereby 
greater opportunities to litigate rights and seek relief leads to limitations on 
the substantive coverage of rights. 
The Court already is faced with difficult problems equilibrating rights 
and remedies, especially in the criminal procedure area, because (1) rights 
apply in essentially the same way to federal, state, and local officials, (2) 
procedural rights are typically transsubstantive—they do not vary with the 
nature or seriousness of the offense or issue, and (3) the availability of 
§ 1983 and Ex parte Young requires the Court to take account of different 
remedial and procedural contexts—defensive and offensive, civil and 
criminal, damages and injunctions.271 
It does not seem unreasonable for courts to be somewhat cautious 
about allowing offensive uses of constitutional rights against the federal 
government in the national security area, because that would add a whole 
new array of difficult issues that must become part of the equilibration. If 
the Court must account for the offensive impact in the national security 
context of all constitutional rights, it might be tempted—as the doctrinal 
equilibration thesis predicts
272—to, for example, narrow the substantive 
contours of rights or increase the protections of qualified immunity for 
officials. It is widely thought that courts will often strain to uphold national 
security policies that the executive contends are essential for the safety of 
the country. If the Court reduced the scope of a right, for instance, because 
of the desire to avoid declaring illegal an important national security policy 
or practice, this narrowed right would henceforth apply to all state, local 
and federal officials, across domestic and national security contexts, 
 
Concerns about the proliferation of constitutional tort suits were cited as reasons for the rule. See 
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 778–79 (Souter, J., concurring). For a rich discussion of whether Miranda is solely 
a trial right, and the implications for coercive interrogation in the war on terror, see generally John T. 
Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation After Chavez v. 
Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733 (2005). The “shocks the conscience” Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process case law, which could apply to limit coercive interrogations, was left untouched by Chavez. 
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774–75 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 271. A recent article suggests that, because “the same rules apply to officers at all levels of 
government” when the Court elaborates qualified immunity doctrines and when it defines the elements 
of a constitutional claim, it makes sense for the same to be true regarding the existence of the cause of 
action—i.e., Bivens should be available for any constitutional claim just like § 1983 is. Pfander & 
Baltmanis, supra note 138, at 139. The authors suggest that “the law of government accountability” 
would be improved if all government officials were subject to the same constitutional restrictions 
through the same type of constitutional tort suits. Id. at 139–40. But there are plausible grounds to think 
the opposite—precisely because the same rules apply to officers at all levels of government, the courts 
are appropriately cautious about allowing robust rights developed in a domestic and local context to be 
enforced via Bivens in novel and often extraterritorial national security situations. 
 272. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
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defensively as well as offensively, in ways that might result in net harm to 
constitutional interests overall. We might call this the potential for “blow 
back”—negative consequences redounding in the domestic realm—if 
Bivens is extended to federal national security activities. 
One way that blow back concerns could be mitigated is if 
constitutional rights are tailored by the Court to the context and severity of 
the offense or issue the government is confronting. This would allow 
tighter rules for ordinary, domestic law enforcement within the United 
States, and looser or different rules for serious national security issues, 
especially those arising overseas (assuming the Constitution applies there at 
all). Although the Court has generally resisted this and insisted that much 
of criminal procedure be transsubstantive,273 there are some areas of 
doctrine where constitutional rights already are or could easily become 
narrowed and tailored for national security contexts.274 We are likely to see 
a lot of narrowing and tailoring if offensive tort suits under Bivens were 
routinely allowed in national security and foreign relations cases. 
The courts’ ability to narrow and tailor rights in high-stakes national 
security or foreign relations contexts does not entirely mitigate concerns 
about blow back. Constitutional constraints loosened only for serious 
national security incidents could be extended to other contexts over time, as 
 
 273. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 274. For instance, the Fourth Amendment rules regarding electronic (and probably physical) 
searches apply somewhat differently “with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents” than it 
does to “domestic aspects of national security” or ordinary law enforcement investigations. United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972). Congress has created a separate 
warrant regime for electronic surveillance, 50 U.S.C §§ 1801–1812 (2006), and physical searches, id. 
§§ 1821–1829, for foreign intelligence purposes in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C §§ 1801–1885c). The “special needs” case law contains hints that preventive searches or 
seizures designed to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or other very serious crime would be subject to 
much looser Fourth Amendment standards. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to 
thwart an imminent terrorist attack . . . .”).  
In New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court permitted a relaxation of Miranda rules to allow brief 
unwarned questioning designed to secure a weapon at a public crime scene; the Justice Department 
believes that this “public safety” rationale can be applied expansively in serious terrorism cases 
involving risks of future attacks. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). For current DOJ 
interpretations of Quarles, see United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
105462, at *13–16 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011). 
Furthermore, in upholding but limiting a form of preventive detention of noncitizens pending removal 
from the country under the immigration statutes, the Court noted that it was not speaking to the issue of 
“terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of 
preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with 
respect to matters of national security.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). 
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the government argues, for example, that it should be allowed to use these 
loosened standards in serious domestic crimes like multiple homicides, 
kidnappings of children, and the like. There are reasons to think that courts 
might struggle to draw appropriate lines.275 
E.  DOMAINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ACCESS TO COURTS 
Expanding and extending constitutional protections to extraterritorial 
locations and to enemies and potential enemies of the United States will 
pose serious practical and doctrinal questions for the courts, necessitating 
new and unpredictable equilibrations of doctrines. It seems appropriate that 
courts would be cautious about extending Bivens in these ways. 
Historically, the right to access U.S. courts and to claim protection 
under U.S. domestic laws, including the Constitution, was limited by 
citizenship, territorial location, and enemy status. Enemy aliens (citizens or 
subjects of a nation at war with the United States), were barred from 
accessing U.S. courts during wartime unless they were resident in America 
and had refrained from taking hostile actions against the United States. And 
all aliens who were outside the United States lacked any rights under the 
U.S. Constitution. Even if present in the United States (say, as prisoners of 
war), enemy fighters lacked any right to access U.S. courts and any 
individual rights under the Constitution.276 Thus, there were historically 
sharp limits to the scope of our constitutional community, and for 
noncitizens, access to U.S. courts and to U.S. constitutional rights 
depended on being a civilian (not an enemy fighter) who was present in the 
United States. 
The inability of enemy aliens and enemy fighters to access U.S. courts 
during war, and the lack of extraterritorial constitutional rights for 
noncitizens had, quite obviously, enormous implications for the 
relationship between the U.S. government and the people against whom 
and among whom many of its national security and foreign relations 
actions took place. Even though, as discussed in Part V.A above, common 
law tort suits were generally available to restrain and remedy lawbreaking 
by U.S. officials, this could not occur for anyone categorically barred from 
 
 275. See Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity Analysis is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
BULL. 1, 5–10 (2012) (explaining reasons why the courts will not follow the reasonableness analysis 
based on crime severity). 
 276. This section draws on several of my previous articles for its account of legal history. See 
generally Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 38; Kent, Insular Cases, supra note 38; Kent, Civil War, 
supra note 168; Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 168; Andrew Kent, Do Boumediene Rights 
Expire?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20 (2012). 
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the courts. The Constitution has come to impose fairly stringent and very 
detailed limitations on how the government can search, eavesdrop, seize 
persons or property, and use violence—the core of many national security 
activities. And so the lack of constitutional rights for noncitizens abroad 
meant that, whether or not an injured party might in theory have been able 
to bring a legal action against the government or its officials, 
extraterritorial U.S. government activity—including all military 
intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement actions—were not limited by 
those robust individual constitutional rights. 
This is either a feature or a bug depending on one’s perspective. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez treated it as a very 
important feature which should not be changed. And he indicated that, if 
constitutional rights were to apply abroad to noncitizens, the fact that a 
Bivens suit would allow them to be used offensively against U.S. officials 
conducting national security functions was intolerable.277 
Applying domestic constitutional norms extraterritorially to national 
security and foreign affairs activities would have an enormously 
constraining effect on U.S. policies and actions. The foreign intelligence 
surveillance and collection framework created by Congress and the 
executive branch assumes that non-U.S. citizens located outside the United 
States lack Fourth Amendment rights.
278
 The executive branch’s internal 
policies for conducting targeted killings pursuant to the post-9/11 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) assume that non-
U.S. citizen targets located outside the United States lack both Fourth 
Amendment and Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.
279
 Indeed most 
military activities during armed conflict—from detention to targeting with 
kinetic force—would run afoul of individual constitutional rights, were 
they applicable. Cooperation with foreign law enforcement entities would 
be significantly constrained if action in coordination with or at the behest 
of the U.S. executive brought with it all of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment apparatus, including various judicial preauthorization 
requirements. Many aspects of U.S. immigration law—for example, the 
national origin preferences or ideological exclusion rules—would be 
unconstitutional if the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment were 
applicable. Covert actions or military actions that selectively fund or target 
 
 277. See supra note 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 246–247 and accompanying text. 
 279. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (allowing 
the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force” to respond to the attacks of September 11, 
2001). 
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groups based on religion or ideological viewpoint—for instance, the Sunni 
Awakening during the conflict in Iraq, or support for anti-Communist 
forces during the Cold War—would probably be unconstitutional if the 
First Amendment were applicable to extraterritorial actions involving non-
U.S. citizens. Many more examples could be given. 
Historically, the lack of extraterritorial constitutional rights for 
noncitizens did not necessarily mean that the U.S. acted lawlessly and 
wantonly when it performed military, intelligence, law enforcement, or 
other functions. Important nonconstitutional rules from treaties, customary 
international law, common law, U.S. statutes, and executive orders, as well 
as diplomacy and considerations of public image and reciprocity, quite 
often gave the U.S. government reasons to act with restraint and some 
measure of concern for individuals. Many of these rules and norms were 
not judicially enforced—for example, the various law-of-war treaties such 
as the Hague Conventions and Geneva Conventions that the United States 
joined. But judicial review and redress for injuries were available in some 
circumstances for U.S. government action abroad.280 As might be expected, 
there were strict limits to this tort liability: from cases arising out of the 
Civil War, we learn that even U.S. citizen civilians in loyal states were not 
protected by tort from militarily necessary actions on the field of battle or 
behind the lines,281 and so a fortiori noncitizens abroad could not have 
been either. 
Thus, when the Supreme Court and other courts have over the years 
been engaged in doctrinal equilibration in the area of tort liability of U.S. 
officials, the lack of extraterritorial constitutional rights for noncitizens 
abroad meant that the judiciary could design doctrines regarding 
constitutional rights, remedies, immunities, and the like without having to 
take account of the possibility that the doctrines it developed for the 
paradigm of domestic peacetime activity would also become applicable to 
 
 280. The famous Marshall Court case of Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) shows 
that when neutrals or U.S. citizens were injured on the high seas by unlawful U.S. naval prize seizures 
during wartime, admiralty courts had jurisdiction to award monetary compensation paid by the U.S. 
officials. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Federal officials who lost tort suits of this kind 
were often indemnified by a private bill passed by Congress. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 187, at 
1889–1904. 
In another famous case, the Supreme Court upheld a tort damages award against a U.S. military officer 
for unnecessarily seizing the property of a U.S. citizen among from the front lines during the Mexican 
War. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 128–32, 137 (1851). 
 281. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 168, at 1920 & n.321 (“In the years after the Civil War, the 
Court held that soldiers and other government officials had no civil liability in tort or otherwise for any 
wartime acts ‘done in accordance with the usages of civilized warfare under and by military authority.’” 
(quoting Freeland v. Williams, 131 U.S. 405, 416 (1889))); supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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extraterritorial national security activity. 
It is not a stretch to think that if the doctrinal equilibration had to 
account for extraterritorial rights for noncitizens, even in national security 
activities, the Court might have defined rights in narrower ways, weakened 
remedies, expanded immunity, or taken other actions that would have 
perhaps had net negative effects on our domestic constitutional law—the 
possible blow back effect discussed above.  
Significant doctrinal and attitudinal changes have occurred in recent 
years that make the possibility of extraterritorial constitutional rights for 
noncitizens a real possibility. Prior to 9/11, the executive branch and the 
courts had to deal with hard questions of this type in law enforcement 
investigations of significant criminal cases.282 Responses to 9/11 by the 
executive finally provided the impetus for the Supreme Court to move 
toward extraterritorial constitutional rights for noncitizens. After hinting at 
it in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,283 the Court in Boumediene v. 
Bush held an individual rights provision of the Constitution applicable to a 
noncitizen abroad for the first time ever.284 Several aspects of the Court’s 
decision, which I have previously written about, suggest that Boumediene 
 
 282. For example, criminal litigation arising out of FBI investigations of al Qaeda terrorism in the 
1990s led some lower courts to hold that, at least for U.S. citizens, but perhaps more generally, 
constitutional rights like the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination had some applicability abroad. See, e.g., United States v. Sadeek Odeh (In re Terrorist 
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges)), 552 F.3d 157, 161, 169 (2d 
Cir. 2008). The Verdugo-Urquidez case, discussed above, arose out of the investigation of the murder of 
a Drug Enforcement Administration agent and a major international narcotics conspiracy. United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262–63 (1990). As part of that litigation, the Supreme Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search in Mexico of a Mexican national’s home by U.S. 
law enforcement acting with Mexican counterparts in order to locate evidence for a U.S. criminal trial. 
Id. at 274–75. 
 283. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 168, at 476–78 (discussing those opinions). 
 284. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (holding the Suspension Clause applicable at 
Guantanamo Bay then noting that “before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained by 
our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights 
under our Constitution”). 
Other Court precedents have raised the possibility of habeas corpus review of U.S. military detention or 
trial operations in foreign battle zones. In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1942), and In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946), the Court held that the Constitution permits noncitizen members of an 
enemy nation’s military who are tried before military commissions on U.S. soil to challenge their 
convictions through habeas corpus in federal court. See Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 38, at 166–
69, 241. In Munaf v. Geren, the Court upheld the jurisdiction and authority of a U.S. district court 
sitting in habeas to review the detention of American citizens held by the U.S. military in Iraq as 
security detainees during the insurgency. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 685–88, 705 (2008). The 
Court’s somewhat cryptic discussion of a substantive due process claim did not conclusively rule out 
the possibility that this could be a constitutional limit on the U.S. government’s authority in the area of 
prisoner transfers. Id. at 706–07. 
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might be the start of applying individual constitutional rights besides 
habeas to noncitizens in truly extraterritorial locations, unlike Guantanamo 
Bay which was really quasi-U.S. territory.285 Unless the Court signals a 
change of course, the possibility of extending the Constitution means that 
the executive must operate under the shadow of the Constitution when its 
agents interact with noncitizens abroad. Injecting Bivens suits into the mix 
could increase the amount and complexity of litigation enormously. 
This possibility of an extraterritorial Constitution protecting 
noncitizens abroad, even during the kind of national security operation 
traditionally thought less suitable for judicialization and 
constitutionalization—military operations in a foreign war zone—is a 
significant new input into the doctrinal equilibration regarding whether to 
extend Bivens rights, and one that the courts could properly take into 
account when deciding whether to extend Bivens. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
It is an unfortunate byproduct of the courts’ hesitation to extend the 
Bivens remedy into national security or foreign relations contexts that 
innocent individuals who have been grievously wronged by federal 
officials are often left with no means of redress.286 If they cannot reach the 
courts during the detention or mistreatment—for example because they are 
held incommunicado outside the United States—neither habeas corpus nor 
an injunction can help them as a practical matter. Once they are released, 
those remedies are by law unavailable. If the individual is never criminally 
prosecuted, the exclusionary rule is not available to vindicate constitutional 
interests. As Justice Harlan said in Bivens, for persons in this situation, “it 
is damages or nothing.”287 
Yet, for the reasons discussed in this Article, the Supreme Court and 
many courts of appeals have been cautious about providing a money 
damages remedy under Bivens in the national security and foreign relations 
contexts.
288
 Might there be any other way to provide some compensation 
without introducing some of the complications that Bivens does?  
As this Article has shown, one of the reasons the courts are reluctant 
to extend Bivens into the national security and foreign relations spheres is a 
 
 285. See Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 38, at 245–48. 
 286. See supra notes 1 & 132 and accompanying text. 
 287. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 288. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text. 
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concern about the judicialization and constitutionalization of security 
policy. Of course, many commentators think more judicialization and 
constitutionalization of the national security and foreign affairs activities of 
the federal government is highly desirable.
289
 But notwithstanding 
Boumediene, the Supreme Court and courts of appeals are quite cautious to 
allow that to occur, especially via constitutional damages suits. 
If it were possible to remove the federal constitutional element of the 
claim for damages against federal officials, the courts’ concerns could be 
eliminated. But repealing the Westfall Act290 and allowing state law tort 
suits against federal officials is not a full solution to the problems of 
judicialization and constitutionalization, because federal officials could 
raise as a defense that their actions were authorized by the Constitution 
itself, or by a law, regulation or policy that the Constitution allowed the 
government to promulgate and enforce. Thus, even though the courts 
would be applying state tort law as the substantive law underpinning the 
claim, the Constitution directly or indirectly (if the plaintiff challenges the 
constitutionality of the officer’s statutory defense) would be involved in the 
courts’ decision. Congress probably could not validly bar federal officials 
from raising colorable defenses arising under the Constitution, and 
therefore, suits against federal officials in their personal capacities will 
never avoid the problems of constitutionalization by the judiciary. 
A more promising avenue would be an administrative compensation 
system running against the United States itself. Because of the sovereign 
immunity of the federal government, this can be accomplished only by 
Congress. To date, Congress has exempted many foreign affairs, national 
security, and military activities from the various administrative 





 the Foreign Claims Act,
293
 and the International 
Agreement Claims Act.294 But it need not be quite so restrictive. 
 
 289. See supra Part VI. 
 290. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 291. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012) (barring claims if, for example, they “aris[e] out of the combatant 
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,” “aris[e] in a foreign 
country,” or are based on intentional torts committed by non-law enforcement personnel). 
 292. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a) (2012) (allowing claims only against “civilian” members of military or 
for “noncombat activities”). 
 293. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b) (2012) (barring claims that “result directly or indirectly from an act of 
the armed forces of the United States in combat” and requiring, if the claim arose during time of war, 
that the foreign national claimant be “determined by the [claims] commission or by the local military 
commander to be friendly to the United States”). 
 294. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734a, 2734b (2012) (allowing claims only if pursuant to an international 
agreement entered into by the executive branch). 
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to draft a model administrative 
claims statute.295 But several features seem important to protect the various 
national security and foreign relations interests. The substantive law 
governing the claims would be not the U.S. Constitution but rather state or 
foreign tort law, or perhaps statutory rules of conduct created by Congress. 
Claimants should probably be required to prove that they are not military 
enemies of the United States. In the current conflict, that would mean that 
persons who are members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces, or 
who substantially supported one of those groups, would be barred from 
pursuing tort damages through the administrative process.296 Discovery 
should probably be absent or very limited, to discourage fishing 
expeditions and to protect classified and otherwise sensitive information. 
But within these (and perhaps other) limits, innocent individuals harmed in 
their persons or property by national security and foreign relations actions 
of the U.S. government should be entitled to reasonable compensation. 
I will not rest the case for such a compensation scheme on a claim that 
its presence would deter misconduct by government officials. There are 
reasons based in economic and organizational theory, and the practical 
realities of how governments respond to tort lawsuits, to think that the 
threat of monetary liability against the sovereign is unlikely to significantly 
deter official misconduct.297 So simple fairness is the best argument. Such a 
scheme could mitigate some of the harshness of the judiciary’s reluctance 
to extend Bivens to national security and foreign relations activities, while 
avoiding many of the complications that Bivens suits would bring. 
  
 
 295. For a fuller discussion, see Brown, supra note 19, at 905–10 (suggesting ways besides Bivens 
that individuals wronged by national security policies can be compensated and abuses brought to light). 
 296. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (setting out the detention authority of the executive branch in the conflict 
with Al Qaeda); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (construing the detention 
authority under the September 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force). 
 297. E.g., Emery & Maazel, supra note 226, at 587–88, 590; Levinson, supra note 226, at 361–87; 
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual 
Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65 passim (1999); Schwartz, supra note 226, at 1025 & n.5, 1027–
28. 
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